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Foreword
The euro-area crisis dominates the economic news. Yet, the world and Europe may
face even more important challenges that will shape our lives and the lives of our
children. World population is projected to increase to 9 billion or more by 2050. At the
same time, current trends indicate an increase in living standards and a growingmiddle
class around theworld. These twomega-trendswill have profound implications, and the
way they are managed will be one of the key determinants of prosperity and peace in
the decades or even centuries to come. A number of factors are important in this
respect.
More people andmore incomewill increase the global demand for energy. Choosing the
right sources of this energywill be one of the determining factors of global temperature.
The continued reliance on fossil-fuel energy sources is one of the main factors behind
the risk of significant global temperature increases. The internationally agreed goal of
limiting the temperature rise to less than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels appears increasingly illusory. Currently, fossil energy sources dominate many
economic areas. For instance, our transport infrastructure is largely based on fossil
fuels, and is thereby one of the main contributor of the carbon dioxide emissions that
are linked to global temperature. Thinking about a decarbonisation strategy is therefore
a key challenge with a global dimension.
Economic growth in Europe will be affected by the costs of this transition from the
current energy and transport system. A smooth transition towards a low-carbon energy
and transport system could come at comparatively modest cost. Furthermore,
identifying the most economically beneficial solutions early on and becoming a global
technology leader and standard setter offers vast opportunities for exports and
economic growth. Hence, our decarbonisation strategy may eventually have a greater
impact on long-term European growth than the current economic crisis.
Bruegel is contributing to this debate with this report, which is based on research that
received funding from the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking. The authors argue
carefully that to make decarbonisation growth friendly, a consistent policy approach
ix
is needed. Policy intervention appears indispensable as the energy and transport
system is so based around and locked-in into an incumbent technology. Overcoming
this lock-in is crucial. The report makes three main proposals. First, the scope,
geographical coverage and duration of carbon pricing should be extended. By setting
a higher carbon price, incentives for developing and investing in new low-carbon
technologies are created. Second, temporary consortia for new infrastructure to solve
early-phase market failures could be put in place. This is discussed using the example
of hydrogen vehicles. Lastly and importantly, an open and public transition model is
needed so that second-best transport solutions do not get a head start that afterwards
cannot be reversed.
The technological, economic and political challenge ahead is vast. But choosing the
right decarbonisaton strategy oﬀers huge economic, environmental and societal
beneﬁts. We should not overlook this debate because of the euro crisis.
Guntram Wolff, Deputy Director, Bruegel
Brussels, January 2012
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Executive summary
Transition is necessary
The major challenge facing the energy and transport system is the reduction of its
fossil fuel consumption and carbon footprint. This requires a shift in the way we
produce and consume energy. Due to the limited carbon-reduction potential of
incumbent technologies, new low-carbon technologies will have to enter the
mainstream market. Some of those new technologies oﬀer signiﬁcant side-beneﬁts
such as reducing local pollutant and noise emissions. Furthermore, decarbonising the
economy based on new technologies could induce growth.
Transition is a complex endeavour
The current energy system, in its complexity, has developed over centuries. The rapid
diﬀusion of new technologies requires either that they have serious advantages over
incumbent technologies, or that downstream changes are minimal. Presently, most
low-carbon energy and transport technologies meet neither of these criteria: they are
more expensive than the technologies they replace but oﬀer little, if any, advantage,
and they require substantial downstream changes to the incumbent energy or
transport system in order to accommodate diﬀerent primary inputs and diﬀerent
operating characteristics. Consequently, transition requires that stakeholders roll-out
all parts of the new system synchronously.
Market failures impede transition
Markets alone will not encourage the development and deployment of un-
competitive technologies, even if they are necessary for a low-carbon future. In
order to encourage the development of these technologies, it is important to
monetise the societal benefits they provide by putting prices on greenhouse gases,
pollution, noise, and import dependency. In the absence of first-best solutions
(for example a global long-term carbon price) policymakers should build on
existing instruments in order to provide sufficient incentives for early investment
1
into research and development, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon
technologies.
Innovation is essential to develop the required new technologies. Without eﬀective
policies to protect intellectual property or alleviate the private costs of innovation,
there will be underinvestment in R&D. But even if competitive low-carbon technologies
are available, path dependencies due to institutions, risk-aversion and network eﬀects
prevent a quick roll out. This poses a huge challenge to policymakers if they are to help
new technologies supplant the incumbent system without favouring one of the
alternatives.
A key to success is domestic and international, and public and private cooperation.
Leaving coordination entirely to the market might result in late deployment and
fragmented networks and markets. Some technologies require a completely new
underlying infrastructure. This infrastructure has a high cost that may not be fully
recoverable by the initial providers, when the business is regulated ex post or late
entrants face lower costs. To recoup their initial investment, providers might have an
incentive to capture customers by implementing artiﬁcial barriers to prevent switching.
This can lead to fragmented markets and slow adaptation of new technologies.
A similar problem is also faced by companies in other parts of the value chain. The
costs of exploring, and building, new markets is high and may not be fully recoverable
given that later entrants may reduce proﬁt margins. Thus, early movers might not be
willing to take risks. This is unfortunate because exploring new low-carbon technology
business models has a high social value. It provides important information to con-
sumers, competitors and politics about the viability of technologies.
Some low-carbon technologies might never be commercialised because better
alternatives exist. However, continuing to fund these technologies might be essential
in case the ﬁrst-best alternative fails to deliver. In this case, having a back-stop
technology on the shelf for quick deployment might save valuable time in the ﬁght
against climate change.
Finally, low-carbon technologies do not only oﬀer environmental beneﬁts. Deploying
and exporting them might oﬀer business opportunities. Under certain conditions it is
even conceivable that economies as awholemight beneﬁt from low-carbon technology
industries that were built on early local deployment. This early deployment of still non-
competitive low-carbon technologies will, however, often not happen without public
support.
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Thus, private investment into new technologies provides many positive spillovers for
society. Asmarkets do not compensate for these spillovers companieswill be reluctant
to make the necessary investments. Consequently, without public intervention, the
transition will only happen slowly or may not take place at all.
Fuel cell electric vehicles will not be provided by the market alone
We use the example of fuel cell electric vehicles to demonstrate that certain low-
carbon technologies only enter the market if at least some of the market failures
previously described are resolved. This example was chosen because fuel cell
electric vehicles promise to be a carbon-free transport alternative with significant
range and no local pollutant and noise emissions, but their deployment is held back
by the very high initial cost and the absence of the required dedicated infrastructure.
Under the existing framework conditions, fuel cell electric vehicles will be virtually
absent from the vehicle market in 2050 while incumbent technologies (gasoline,
diesel) will still play a major role. We show that this changes when policies are
implemented to account for the emission cost of conventional vehicles, support to
R&D is provided and the infrastructure externality is overcome. With such a con-
certed approach, fuel cell electric vehicles might become an important transport
technology by 2050, accounting for more than 10 percent of the market. Early cost
reductions (such as through R&D) are essential to overcome the gap that prevents
deployment. In the most optimistic scenario based on industry forecasts, fuel cell
electric vehicles might capture more than 25 percent of the market according to our
modelling.
Existing tools are insuﬃcient
There is an extensive menu of current policies at regional, national and European levels
that are intended to address the market failures. Fuel taxes, vehicle emission
standards and R&D funding, for example, can be eﬀective tools for tackling some of the
barriers. However, the totality of current policies is insuﬃcient to resolve the market
failures that hamper the transition. There are insuﬃcient funds for R&D, no global long-
term carbon price, and deployment eﬀorts are not coordinated. Most importantly, no
solution for the infrastructure externality is being implemented, and support for
technologies is not predictable.
Smart policy tools for transition
To enable the private sector to make the necessary investments for development and
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deployment of the technologies needed for the energy and transport system
transition, a set of smart policies needs to be implemented.
First of all, the cost of carbon in diﬀerent sectors needs to be aligned in order to
stimulate eﬃcient emission-mitigation behaviour. Thus, all forms of transport should
be included in the European Union emissions trading system (ETS). A corresponding
additional carbon component in the fuel price would ensure that consumers’ daily
modal choice decisions take the carbon cost into account and thus prevent lower fuel
consumption incentivising increased vehicle use. Second, policymakers need to
convince companies that carbon will continue to be sensibly priced beyond 2020.
Thus, policy should ﬁnancially commit their future budgets vis-à-vis companies that
invest in low-carbon technologies to preserve the operability of the EU ETS beyond
2020. This could, for example, be achieved by letting public banks issue options on the
carbon price. Signiﬁcant exposure of public banks to the carbon price could serve as
a tool to commit future policymakers to ensuring the reliability of the system over
decades. Third, tightening average emission standards for certain appliances is an
eﬀective second-best solution for incentivising the provision of low-carbon appliances
in the absence of a global and long-term carbon price.
To provide the refuelling stations for new fuels that existing markets will not deliver,
we suggest the establishment of temporary infrastructure consortia for the diﬀerent
low-carbon fuels. Each consortium would plan and organise the deployment of its res-
pective fuelling station infrastructure. For this purpose, each consortium would be
given the exclusive right to sell local concessions for new fuel stations to interested
retailers. Consequently, competition between diﬀerent low-carbon fuels and diﬀerent
retailers would be ensured. Finally, each consortium might organise internal cross-
subsidisation between diﬀerent parts of the value chain (for example, fuel and vehicle
producers might support infrastructure) and between diﬀerent fuel stations (for
example, fuel outlets in remote areas might obtain support from fuel outlets in densely
populated areas), if it ﬁnds that this encourages quicker roll-out of their technology. To
avoid abuse, all relevant stakeholders should participate in the consortia and their
constitution should be cleared ex ante by competition authorities.
Furthermore, the public and private sectors should explore new ways of sharing risk.
Governments might participate in the up-side of successful technologies by making
grants reimbursable in successful cases. Meanwhile public ﬁnancing or guarantees
dedicated to business units with a high concentration of regulatory risks might
incentivise investment for two reasons. First, the corresponding company would be
less exposed to regulatory uncertainty and might ﬁnd it easier to acquire private
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ﬁnance for its low-carbon projects. Second, public exposure to regulatory risk signals
commitment to existing policies and reduces regulatory uncertainty in the private
sector as a whole.
One major improvement to current deployment policies would be to use public
procurement strategically for experimenting with alternative technologies. We suggest
that publicly ﬁnanced trials (for example, for municipal vehicle ﬂeets) should be
allowed to fail commercially in order to avoid the focus on low-risk technologies. For this
purpose, compensation for failed trials should be oﬀered at a federal level, provided
that the individual trial is part of a coordinated experimental scheme.
Finally, the most important step for supporting new technologies is a transparent and
predictable support policy for all competing technologies. A consistent policy should
primarily comprise a set of horizontal policies to resolve existing market failures (eg
carbon pricing). But in the absence of horizontal ﬁrst-best solutions for some market
failures, the public sector should return to technology-speciﬁc support instruments
for R&D and deployment. In this context, technology choice is critical. In the presence
of multiple new technologies that compete not only for a market but also for production
inputs (such as capital, labour and raw materials), excessive support to one
technology might slow down the development of others. Consequently, a well-thought-
through and structured approach adapted to the complexity of the challenge is needed.
For this purpose, government should adopt a choice mechanism that is dynamic and
adaptable, able to digest new information and optimise support in a quick, reliable,
and eﬀective manner. Predictability and technology-neutrality can only be ensured
when technology choice is based on metrics and priorities deﬁned by politics.
Stakeholders need to be incentivised to provide unbiased forecasts of the capabilities
of their technology. These forecasts should be processed in an open multi-technology
model to provide guidance for the targeting of support. A corresponding model should
be built, maintained, extended and published by an independent public institution.
This transparent mechanism would ensure that stakeholders can predict public
technology decisions, and would thus ﬁnd it easier to commit to the long-term and
risky investments that are needed to make the low-carbon energy and transport
system transition a reality.
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1 Rationale for supporting the
transition to a new energy
and transport system
1.1 Beneﬁts of a new energy and transport system
The current energy and transport system is unsustainable. In 2009, emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG) from the 27 EU countries in the road transport and energy
sectors amounted to 4.8 tonnes per capita. This is more than double the level typically
considered sustainable (two tonnes per capita per year)1. Consequently, the EUhas set
a 60percent reduction target for GHGemissions for the transport sector2 and an80-100
percent reduction target for the energy sector by 2050 compared to 1990 levels.
Currently, the transport and energy sectors are responsible for the majority of EU oil
and gas imports. Approximately 75 percent of final energy consumption of oil is due
to transport, and about 29 percent of final energy consumption of gas is due to the
electricity sector (Eurostat, 2009a and 2009b). In 2009, the EU had to import 83.5
percent of consumed petroleum products, and 64.2 percent of consumed gas3,4. The
EU considers reducing/containing this dependence to be an important factor in
securing European energy supplies. As domestic sources of fossil fuels are limited,
only a reduction in the total consumption of fossil fuels can reduce Europe’s import
dependency. Consequently, the major challenge facing the energy and transport
6
1. 4.8 tonnes is a result of a calculation using data on page 80 of EEA (2011). In 2009, GHG emissions per capita, for
the EU27, was 9.2 tonnes. According to the pie charts, transport share of GHG emissions was 20.2 percent and
energy supply share of GHG emissions was 32.4 percent, implying that approximately 4.8 tonnes per capita of
GHG emissions are due to the transport and energy sector.
2. COM (2011)144, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0144:EN:NOT
3. Reducing the fuel consumption of a sector not only reduces import dependency but – in case it induces a
signiﬁcant reduction in fossil fuels consumption – lowers fossil fuel prices. This induces a shift in welfare from oil
exporting to oil importing countries.
4. The numbers refer to the Eurostat energy dependency ﬁgures.
system is the reduction of its fossil fuel consumption and carbon footprint.
With the current fuel mix5, even the most ambitious improvements to incumbent
technologies are likely to be insuﬃcient for reaching the reduction targets set by the
EU. For example, improvements to motor vehicle internal combustion engines and
conventional power plants are limited by physical factors. Fuel consumption would
converge to a technical minimum that is signiﬁcantly above zero. Consequently, the
deployment of new clean energy and transport technologies would be necessary to
maintain the current service level at near zero emissions.
An additional motivation for carbon-free technologies is that they often oﬀer signiﬁcant
side-beneﬁts. For example, internal combustion engines are responsible for a
signiﬁcant portion of local pollutant6 and noise emissions. For this reason, internal
combustion engines are, in contrast to some of the proposed alternative technologies,
also detrimental to public health. Thus, signiﬁcant societal beneﬁts, in terms of
greenhouse gas mitigation, decreased fuel dependency, and reduced local emissions
of pollutants and noise, can be expected as results of a transition towards a clean
energy and transport sector.
Furthermore, various authors have argued that decarbonising the economy could
induce growth (eg Huberty et al, 2011). Policy arguments for green growth span a wide
range of economic, environmental and social concerns. A sampling of such arguments
demonstrates their diversity:
1. Keynesian demand stimulus for short-term job creation via deﬁcit-ﬁnanced
investment in energy eﬃciency and energy infrastructure: for example, Houser et
al (2009, 2-5) ﬁnds that green stimulus in the US performed as well as or better
than traditional stimulus, creating 20 percent more jobs than traditional infra-
structure spending.
2. Improved trade competitiveness via reduced exposure to terms-of-trade pressures
from fossil fuel imports, particularly petroleumandnatural gas. Decreasing demand
for fossil fuel imports reduces the world market price of fossil fuels. Thus, the terms-
of-trade of energy importers improve, ie EU countries will have to export less in
order to pay for foreign fuels. Thus, domestic consumption and consumer welfare
can increase.
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5. Many observers dismiss biofuels based on expected cost (Runge and Senauer, 2007; Ryan et al, 2006; Delgado
and Santos, 2008)
6. Eg Oxides of nitrogen (NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOC), ozone, particles and Sulphur Oxides (SOx).
3. Increased innovation in response to greater administrative constraints (also known
as the ‘Porter Hypothesis’): Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that stringent
regulation pays for itself by inducing private sector innovation. Additionally, WEF-
BCG (2011) argues that companies that comply with stricter standards do better
economically7.
4. Publicly supported deployment creates markets for new technologies that might
have a higher than proportionate local value content. Thus, new jobsmight emerge
(Wei et al, 2010).
5. Revenues from a ‘polluter pays’ scheme – such as emission allowance auction
receipts or green taxes might be used to reduce distorting taxes on labour and
capital. Under certain conditions a ‘double dividend’ in terms of higher growth may
arise (see Goulder, 1995).
6. Redirecting innovation and investments at an early stage to the growing sector of
clean technologies might help some countries retain or even strengthen their
international competitiveness, thereby boosting their economies and creating jobs.
For example, Huberty and Zachmann (2011) argue that state-supported deploy-
ment can partly explain the success of the wind industry in Denmark and Germany.
Thus, the transition to a newenergy and transport systempromises signiﬁcant societal
beneﬁts. As the next section demonstrates, a number of market failures impede such
a transition. Thus, without public intervention the transition will only happen slowly or
may completely fail to take place.
1.2 Market failures that impede an optimal transition
The current energy system, in its complexity, has developed over centuries. Though it
suﬀers from an extreme degree of inertia, the energy system has undergone a series
of transformations over time: from wood to coal, coal to oil, and to electriﬁcation. In
each of these cases, the new energy source proved cheaper or more versatile than the
one it supplanted or complemented. However, inertia in the energy system, due to
path dependencies and market failures, such as network externalities, led to very slow
transitions. Despite the notable advantages of each successive fuel, transitions took
time: perhaps 200 years for coal and 75 for both oil and electricity. Inertia in previous
transitions has been due to extant market failures.
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7. However, some economists have argued that these ﬁndings are due to the so called ‘environmental Kuznets curve’,
which postulates that, after a certain threshold, pollution intensity decreases with increasing economic activity.
Therefore, rapid diﬀusion of new technologies requires them to have either serious
advantages over incumbent technologies or minimal downstream changes to work.
Presently, ‘green’ energy and transport technologies meet neither of these criteria:
they generate more expensive but, at best, indistinguishable services compared to
the technologies they replace, and they require substantial downstream changes to
the incumbent energy or transport system in order to accommodate diﬀerent primary
inputs and diﬀerent operating characteristics. Thus, the inertia witnessed in prior
transformations may provide only a conservative estimate for the scale of the green
energy and transport transition challenge. The deployment of new energy and
transport technologies will be hampered by their higher cost and technical
shortcomings (eg range for battery cars, temperature sensitivity for fuel cell cars,
volatility of the electricity produced by wind turbines). Markets alone will not
encourage the development and deployment of uncompetitive technologies, even if
they are necessary for a low-carbon future. In order to encourage the development of
these technologies, it is important to monetise the societal beneﬁts they provide by
putting prices on greenhouse-gases, pollution, noise, and import dependency. But
even after monetising the societal beneﬁts, there are extant market failures which may
hinder the development of new energy technologies or the transition to low-carbon
fuels and technologies.
In this section, we will discuss market imperfections responsible for underinvestment
in new energy and transport technologies, and how they have been dealt with in other
cases.
1.2.1 Climate externality
Cumulative greenhouse-gas emissions cause global warming, implying potentially
huge economic costs to society8. Thus, each source of greenhouse-gas emissions has
a societal cost (a so called ‘negative externality’). To introduce the correct incentives
for greenhouse-gas mitigation, various schemes have been proposed. The spectrum
ranges from administrative measures, such as the prohibition of certain polluting
technologies or emission restrictions, to the implementation of a ‘polluter pays’
principle via carbon taxes or tradable emission allowances.
Ideally, the introduction of a long-term carbon price reﬂecting the true cost of
emissions, via taxes or tradable allowances, would be the ﬁrst-best solution for
reducing emissions at the lowest cost. It would ensure that emissions are reduced in
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
9
8. Stern (2006).
those sectors where abatement is most easily achieved. However, the ﬁrst-best is not
possible because (1) The optimal level of emission abatement – ie the level at which
the cost of an additional abatement eﬀort exceeds the beneﬁt of the induced climate
change mitigation – is unknown; (2) in the absence of an international agreement, a
local carbon price has only a limited eﬀect on overall abatement. The reason is that
greenhouse-gas-emitting companies or sectors might move to countries without a
carbon price (carbon leakage) or that, due to reduced demand for fossil fuels in the
countries with a strict carbon price, fuel prices will decrease and result in higher fuel
demand elsewhere (indirect leakage); (3) ﬁnally, there are numerous political
constraints. Transport and energy costs are important factors for regional
competitiveness, so policymakers are very cautious in implementing legislation which
directly implies raising costs.
Unstable and inadequate carbon prices have developed in the EU. Other countries (eg
Australia, China) are also considering implementing incomplete carbon trading
schemes. In the presence of only a local and short-term carbon price, there would be
under-investment in new energy and transport technologies. Companies face smaller
than optimal current and future markets for clean technology, and, as a result, do not
invest in technologies that might incur a high cost per ton of carbon abated in a small
market in the short term. However, learning and economies-of-scale savingsmay result
in a much lower long-term carbon abatement cost. The main beneﬁt of limited deploy-
ment of the new technologies is not so much the direct reduction in greenhouse gases,
pollution, noise, and fuel imports; rather it is the induced cost savings due to learning-
by-doing, learning-about-costs, and learning-through-R&D. This learning makes later
and larger deployments cheaper and thus reduces the cost of achieving beneﬁts at a
large scale. Furthermore, cost reductions resulting from learning might make the
technologies competitive even in environments with less ambitious carbon mitigation
policies (eg developing and emerging countries). Therefore, in the absence of a long-
term global carbon price, it is sensible to provide incentives for R&D and deployment
of these technologies, so as to approach the socially optimal investment level. In the
EU, for example, signiﬁcant support for renewable energy technologies and energy
eﬃciency is partly justiﬁed as compensating the imperfections of the carbon market.
The ﬂipside of having multiple instruments to incentivise emission reductions is that
it inevitably leads to diﬀerent prices for carbon in diﬀerent sectors. According to
Fankhauser et al (2010), combining taxes, subsidies, or standards with cap-and-trade
instruments can undermine the carbon price and increase mitigation costs. That is,
the absence of a single carbon price signal to coordinate abatement decisions in all
sectors is causing economic ineﬃciencies. Consequently, there is over-abatement in
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some sectors (replacing classic lightbulbs in some applications implies huge cost per
ton of carbon abated) and under-abatement in most other sectors (most new-builds of
coal ﬁred power plantswould not happen at a suﬃciently high and stable carbonprice).
Conclusion: Climate change is a pressing issue which poses huge negative exter-
nalities. There is currently no eﬀective policy tool for internalising the long-term
international costs of climate change.
Recommendation: Policy should continue to strive for a global long-term carbon price.
Moreover, policy should complement existing instruments with incentives for early
investment into R&D, demonstration and deployment of clean technologies. Clean
technologies are essential to achieving timely carbon mitigation.
1.2.2 Innovation externality
Innovation, especially as it pertains to specialised technologies, comes at a cost – the
cost of R&D. Although acquired knowledge may oﬀset the cost of innovation for the
investing ﬁrm, this knowledge may be non-rival and non-excludable. This means that
other ﬁrms may acquire the ability to imitate these innovations and lower their own
production costs, without having incurred the cost of R&D. Additionally, even if they do
not have the ability to imitate the speciﬁc innovation, they may gain some beneﬁcial
knowledge spillovers from the innovator. Therefore, R&D investments confer a positive
externality to outside ﬁrms. This results in a situation where individual ﬁrms under-
invest in R&D because they do not fully internalise the social beneﬁts of R&D
investments or because they anticipate costless beneﬁts to be gained from the
investments of others.
This eﬀect is present in all sectors. In order to facilitate the internalisation of this
externality, several policy instruments are available: protecting intellectual property
rights (eg throughpatents or trade secrets), government funding for R&Dand subsidies
for private R&D.
Patents are a tool for removing the non-excludable aspect of innovations. Making
innovations excludable would prevent ﬁrms that did not participate in R&D from
reaping the beneﬁts of the resulting technology at zero cost. In addition, excludability
has the added beneﬁt of reducing incentives to secrecy over technological knowledge
which may beneﬁt society. However, patents are an imperfect tool. A strong patent
system increases incentives to innovate but decreases competition. As per
Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, market power is a driving force of
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innovation as innovation is a mechanism for destroying the market share of
competitors. Therefore, in practice, patents are characterised by two dimensions:
lifespan, and breadth. These two dimensions inﬂuence the degree of eﬀectiveness of
patents in encouraging innovation. In addition, enforcement eﬀectiveness and
enforcement speed are issues which aﬀect the impact of patents on innovation.
Therefore, patent eﬀectiveness also relies on eﬀective institutions, and trust in the
institutions of individual countries. The energy and transport system transition is an
international eﬀort and will rely on institutional strength in multiple countries. Thus,
strong international patent protection might increase the number of green innovations.
However, strong international patent protection also allows innovators to demand
higher prices for their more exclusive rights. This might decrease the rate of market
uptake. Another weakness of patents in internalising the innovation externality is that
they often cannot be applied to process knowledge (eg Ford’s assembly line), which
in many cases can only be protected via secrecy. Thus, patents alone cannot ensure
an optimal level of innovation activity.
Another avenue of internalisation has to do with relieving the imbalance between costs
to innovators and the social beneﬁts of the innovations. This can be done via
government-funded R&D or via government subsidies for private R&D. As the positive
spillovers from energy and transportation technology innovations are essentially a
public good, it may make sense for governments to contribute to the cost of producing
them. Implementation is, however, key, as public R&D money risks simply replacing
private R&D money without increasing the overall innovation level9. Governments may
sponsor R&D wholly or via public-private partnerships. In such partnerships, it is often
the case that intellectual property resulting from collaboration is shared via patents or
contractual stipulations.
Consortiums of members from government, industry, and academia may provide a
way to direct R&D toward industry-applicable solutions. Consortiums, although they
produce more general intellectual property, may be an important avenue for
coordinating eﬀorts and may partially internalise the non-excludable nature of
innovation. Furthermore, academic research which is wholly publically funded runs
the risk of not being adopted or adoptable by industry. Consortiums are a way to share
intellectual property rights and the costs of producing intellectual property (see Box
1). However, the R&D collaboration between competitors in the product market risks
entailing anti-competitive eﬀects10.
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
12
9. David et al (2000) argue that the literature on whether public R&D is a complement or substitute for private R&D
has been inconclusive.
10. See for example Goeree and Helland (2009).
Conclusion: Innovation carries with it a positive externality. Without proper policies to
protect intellectual property or alleviate the private costs of innovative activities, there
may be underinvestment in R&D.
Recommendation: Government policy should augment investment in R&D for areas
where intellectual property protection is not enough. Consortiums may be useful in
encouraging industry-oriented innovation and may alleviate some of the issues
created by non-excludability.
1.2.3 Path dependencies
The transition from one energy system to another may be subject to path-dependence
on, or lock-in eﬀects from, existing systems. Path-dependence or lock-in, in the market
failure sense, is the inability of the market to switch technologies despite the
knowledge that the incumbent technology11 is inferior or undesirable relative to an
alternative (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). This is often due to the switching costs
being higher than the beneﬁt for some pivotal actors in the system.
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11. Path-dependence based on insuﬃcient knowledge at the beginning is not ex-ante ineﬃcient but can be ex-post
ineﬃcient.
BOX 1: R&D CONSORTIA
The VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated circuit) project was designed to help Japan
catch up with semiconductor technology. The project was conducted between 1975
and 1985 with a budget of €1.25 billion, of which 22 percent was ﬁnanced by the
government. It developed state-of-the-art semiconductormanufacturing technology.
All the major Japanese semiconductor producers participated in this project, and
Japanese semiconductor companies gained world leadership in this period. Beyond
this anecdotal evidence, it was found that consortia have the eﬀect of stimulating
innovative activity in the selected ﬁrms. However, this comes at a cost. Among other
components, these costs include the eﬀects of reduced competition, administrative
burdens on the research personnel of participating ﬁrms, and cost of government
subsidies.
Take-home message: R&D cooperation between competing companies might
stimulate innovation but can have high long-term cost.
Source: Sakakibara (1997).
The market failure can occur for a number of reasons: lock-in due to uncertain payoﬀ
functions; lock-in due to learning-by-doing; institutional lock-in; and lock-in due to
network eﬀects.
Lock-in due to uncertain payoﬀ functions
Often, when a new technology is introduced, its future payoﬀs are uncertain, ie even
the distribution of payoﬀs is unknown. Cowan (1991) develops a model of lock-in
referring to technologies of unknown merit as ‘tortoises and hares’. He demonstrates
that the reduction of uncertainty stemming from the adoption process may lead to
lock-in. One illustrative example of lock-in due to learning-about-payoﬀs is the example
of the two-armed bandit slot machine. Each arm of the slot machine has a diﬀerent
distribution of payoﬀs. However, over time, the player may converge on one arm if it is
used more. As the player learns more about the payoﬀ distribution of one arm (the
one which is used more), he refrains from investing money to obtain knowledge on
the payoﬀ distribution of the other arm. Similarly, this analogy can be applied to
technologies of unknown merit. Costly learning about a priori uncertain payoﬀ
functions can create a lock-in eﬀect.
Lock-in due to learning-by-doing
Learning-by-doing can lead to technology lock-in. A more frequently-used technology
tends to move along its learning curve faster, and may thus cause a cost-related snow-
ball eﬀect where adopters continue along the path even with the knowledge that the
technology is inferior or undesirable. Thus, an inferior but more-developed technology
may become locked-in. This lock-in is exacerbated over time. Acemoglu et al (2009)
show that even research tends to ‘build on the shoulders of giants’, the giants being
incumbent technologies.
Institutional lock-in
A potentially less obvious form of lock-in is institutional and policy lock-in. The
automotive industry is an example of an industry for which institutional lock-in exists.
Both formal and informal private institutions have developed alongside the internal
combustion engine technological system. Knowledge-based institutions, such as
technical schools, developed to train labour for servicing a growing auto network.
Higher-learning disciplinary departments like highway or automobile engineering are
intrinsically linked with the automobile industry. Industry approaches may become
locked-in as a ‘curriculum’ for long periods. In addition, unions, industry associations,
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and media (eg Motor World, Motor Age) have emerged. The existence of specialised
labour for this technology creates a sort of lock-in.
Public institutional lock-in may also occur. Subsidies or government institutions can
have long-term impacts and persist for long periods of time. Williamson (1998) found
that formal institutions change over decades while informal institutions, such as
culture or norms, change over centuries. In the case of the automobile industry, a large
network of institutions, including the American Automobile Association, the American
Road Builders Association, and National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, formed
alongside the technology; the ‘highway lobby’ is still seen as one of the most powerful
interest groups (Unruh, 2000). The existence of government institutions speciﬁc to a
technology might lead to policy biases as the obsolescence of a technology would
mean the obsolescence of that institution. Public support of certain standards or
technologies may exacerbate lock-in. This was the case for light-water nuclear reactor
adoption (seeBox2 for details). The policies adopted by theUSwere biased toward one
technology (Walker, 2000), and this also contributed to the choice of that technology
in Europe, due to US aid (Cowan, 1990). Another example is the case of German coal
subsidies which have persisted long after German coal became much more expensive
than imported coal. Path dependencies exist due to the skill-set of the workforce in
the Ruhr Valley of Germany, coupled with existing subsidies.
In general, institutional lock-in has the potential to create non-market forces that
enhance technological lock-in. Institutional policy can override the neo-classical
market forces of competition by removing uncertainty about the direction of
technological development. Firms might then favour a certain technology not in
response to market forces but to institutional ones. Care should be taken to develop
policies and institutions which are not prone to lock-in and which are ﬂexible to
changing environments – ie not technology-speciﬁc. The fact that technology lock-in
occurs naturally due to imperfect information and learning curves provides a case for
government intervention. In the initial stages of a technology, when its merit is as yet
unknown, government support should not be biased toward support for a single
technology. Switching support at a later time is less eﬀective and more costly due to
learning costs (if no investment or learning was done in the interim), and potential
network eﬀects from the adopted technology. Thus, prior to the creation of subsidies
and other institutions, governments should carefully consider their necessity and
determine the ease of shifting from the respective subsidies and institutions in the
future. This premeditation on the part of government would help in avoiding
institutional lock-in.
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Lock-in due to network eﬀects
Network eﬀects are present when switching between products is costly and the value
of a product increases with the number of users of the product (eg telephones) or the
presence of complementary products (eg software for a speciﬁc hardware). In energy
and transport systems, we are faced with the second type of network eﬀect. Complex
value chains focused on the incumbent technology (in transport: car manufacturers,
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
16
BOX 2: NUCLEAR REACTORS
The widespread adoption of light-water reactors for nuclear power generation may
be seen as a case of technological lock-in. Initially, there were three competing
reactor technologies: light water, heavy water and gas graphite. Light water has
captured most of the market, despite doubts about its technological superiority. For
example, occupational radiation is 10 times lower for gas graphite reactors. Heavy-
water reactors in Canada have been estimated to generate power at about 75percent
of the cost of light-water reactors of the same size (Cowan 1990). However, by 1975,
there were only two distinct reactor types in the marketplace, and the majority of
reactors planned or built were light water. The United States had originally developed
light-water reactors for military uses and thus was much-advanced along that
learning curve, compared to the other reactor types, when demand for civilian
nuclear power emerged. Although countries such as Britain and France were
developing their own gas graphite technologies, European countries, via the Euratom
High Commission, signed an accord with the US. US support for light-water reactors
was likely strengthened by the new orders from Europe, and the US provided
ﬁnancial aid and technical assistant to Europe. The US-Euratom accord even aﬀected
fuel prices, as prices for enriched uranium were subsidised. Graphite reactors did
not need enricheduranium, but this advantagewas dampenedby the lowered prices
of enricheduranium. Although there was debate throughout the1970s, development
of nuclear technologies was expensive and both gas graphite and heavy water
presented technical problems. The UK eventually adopted light water as it had been
thoroughly developed outside the UK.
Take-home message: Government support might tip the balance towards one
technology. This might speed up the selection process but it may not be eﬃcient in
the long-term, especially when the merit of technologies is unclear at the beginning
and government choice is driven by secondary objectives.
Source: Cowan (1990).
fuel producers, fuel distribution, and consumers) create a classical lock-in eﬀect. This
problem is exacerbated when switching costs are high. Switching costs are a function
of: the investment cost of the components, the minimum (eﬃcient) network size, and
the level of uncertainty about the new system. Thus, highly capital-intensive systems,
with signiﬁcant scale economies and a large number of alternatives will be the most
diﬃcult to replace. Consequently, bringing a new technology to market in such a
system requires that it is either largely compatible with the incumbent system (eg
through hybridisation or the use of adaptors), to beneﬁt from incumbent network
eﬀects, or that it manages to eﬀectively deploy its own system.
Conclusion: When governments, ﬁrms and consumers must choose between tech-
nologies of unknown merit, technological and institutional lock-in may occur where
path dependency on a suboptimal technology develops. This can become even more
pronounced when network eﬀects are also at play.
Recommendation: Technology-neutrality in public support at the early stages, when
the winners are unclear, is important. Support may be needed to overcome path
dependency on established networks.
1.2.4 Coordination externality
Any transition from one system to another requires coordination among the
stakeholders. As the energy and transport sector is very capital-intensive, lack of
coordination during the transition is very costly. Standardisation is a primary
coordinationmechanism. According to Swann (2010), there are four diﬀerent purposes
for standardisation: compatibility/interface standards and variety reduction standards
are utilised to reduce the fragmentation of a network, and to provide compatibility
requirements in order to allow entry into the market. Minimum quality standards are
important in ensuring a level of safety for consumers. Information standards are used
to homogenise information in order to lower information costs (eg for comparing
products).
Thus, standardisation is critical for the development of complex markets. However,
standardisation itself is costly, and the incentives to sponsor standardisation do not
naturally lead to a welfare-optimal set of standards.
Firms involved in standardisation (typically the ﬁrst-movers in a market) will have
heterogeneous preferences. On the onehand, eachﬁrmwould prefer a set of standards
that increases the value of the capabilities, patents and business model of said ﬁrm.
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
17
On the other hand, all companies want to avoid a situation in which the adopted
standard locks them out of the market. Due to the high number of stakeholders
involved, and the complexity of the technical questions, complicated negotiations
between stakeholders may emerge. These might take years and consume valuable
resources and time. Consequently, ﬁrst-movers who participate in the coordination of
standards impose a positive externality on late-comers by absorbing the costs of
standardisation. Late-comers can free-ride on the coordination eﬀorts without paying
the price for it.
Due to this market failure, if left to their own devices, ﬁrst-movers may prefer to form
fragmented networks/markets to avoid laborious and costly coordination (see Box 3
for a case-study on a failed standardisation eﬀort). Alternatively, in the absence of
other stakeholders in the coordination process, a minority of engaged companies may
push through a standard that is clearly not in the best interest of society. Consequently,
public intervention might prove valuable for resolving this market failure. Public
intervention in standardisation should take place when there is a weak, or no,
coordination mechanism between competing companies in a market. Governments
may intervene through administering the standardisation process, and/or through
ﬁnancial subsidies to overcome coordination problems at the R&D stage, and/or to
mitigate the deployment barriers imposed by market competition. Public-private
partnerships are another avenue for facilitating coordination.
It is worth noting that government interests may not necessarily be in line with the
short-term interests of companies active in the standardisation process. The public
sector puts greater importance on customer interests and on the long-term health of
standards infrastructure. Standards-setting can have diﬀerent eﬀects on innovation
andR&D investments depending upon the implementation and strictness of standards
(see Box 4 for the pharmaceutical industry case study).
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BOX 3: JAPAN AND THE CELLULAR GALAPAGOS
Japanese cellular phone companies have long been leaders in delivering advanced
handset technologies and services to their consumers. The ﬁrst cellular data
services were available in Japan in 1997 at extraordinarily low rates. Cellular phones
arewidely used in Japan as substitutes for ﬁnancial instruments like debit and credit
cards. Yet despite technical leadership that is often years ahead of foreign
competitors, Japanese ﬁrms have had almost no success selling into foreign cellular
device and service markets.
As Kushida (2011) explains, the Japanese inability to capitalise on leadership in
network technologies stems from both public and private decisions. Domestically,
device and service companies were vertically integrated, allowing them to resolve
the tension between network and product introduction by internalising the design
and deployment of both. This led to very early, highly competitive markets in cellular
data services, perhaps ﬁve years before similar markets emerged in the US and
Europe. But in practice, competition in an isolated market meant that Japanese
products andnetwork standards diverged from international norms in order to deliver
ever-more-exotic products to customers.
As a result, when Japanese ﬁrms then attempted to take their advanced tech-
nologies abroad, they found they were incompatible with the networks those
markets depended on. It mattered little that Japanese technology was years ahead
of the competition. Japan’s failure to keep international standards and domestic
markets in sync locked it out of capturing export beneﬁts from its domestic technical
leadership. Like Darwin’s ﬁnches, Japanese cellular ﬁrms were highly adapted to
their isolated market, but bizarre and strange creatures elsewhere.
Take-home message: International coordination and the development of inter-
national standards is key. Government policies and ﬁrms should pay attention to
the developments of other nations and coordinate/adapt to changing international
standards so as to be competitive on the global market. Technological sophistication
is not enough to ensure the success of a technology.
Source: Kushida (2011).
Public intervention may have diﬀerent impacts on standards development. Positive
eﬀects are generated by the facilitation of coordination activities and the
establishment of special bodies for this purpose. Negative eﬀects can emerge when
preferences are given to certain technologies by oﬃcials, from a political or short-term
perspective. Illustrations of a positive and a negative result are provided in Box 5.
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BOX 4: STANDARDISATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
A BARRIER OR INCENTIVE FOR R&D?
Excessively strict standardsmay stiﬂe innovation as theymayaﬀect the proﬁtability
of certain products. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, investments in
product development are not made on the basis of potential beneﬁts to society, but
on the basis of maximal future returns. Therefore, if standards are overly strict,
companies may decide not to develop or produce medicines eﬀective in treating
life-threatening diseases but which do not meet proﬁtability criteria. Excessive
regulatory burden can result in a decrease or cancellation of R&D for certain drugs.
In the past 20 years, several countries and regions (Australia, the EU, Japan and the
US), have adopted orphan drug legislation (ODL). Incentives included fast-track
procedures for standardisation and reduced registration fees. This legislation has
been successful in the promotion of the development of drugs for rare diseases or
diseases which are prevalent in poorer countries.
Take-home message: Governments need to ensure in developing standards that
their strictness does not make investment in products that are beneﬁcial to society
unproﬁtable.
Source: Reich et al (2009).
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BOX 5: EUROPEAN COMMISSION INTERVENTION IN STANDARDISATION
IN TV AND TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES
Failure case: HDTV standard
In 1986, the Commission initiated the development of a high deﬁnition standard for TV
set manufacturers and broadcasters (HD-MAC). This eﬀort was in response to Japan’s
attempts to set up the world’s ﬁrst high-deﬁnition TV standard. To stimulate early
deployment the Commission made the decision to favour a certain technology during
the early stages of the process. Due to its high complexity the technology promised
highermargins toTVmanufacturers.But itwasalsomoreexpensive forbroadcastersand
consumers. Consequently, the take-upof thenewtechnologywas limited. In1992, the
Commission tried to interveneagainandoﬀeredﬁnancialsubsidies for thebroadcasting
companies in exchange for agreeingwith TV set producers to have standards for a new
version of HD-MAC. However, it was too late for HD-MAC due to the advance of digital
broadcasting technologies. Public support for TV standardisation has now been
redirected towards wide screen TV standards corresponding to digital broadcasting.
Success case: GSM standard
In the 1970s, the Commission initiated the Global System of Mobile Telecom-
munications (GSM) project in order to narrow the gapbetweenUS/Japanese telecom
companies andEuropeanones. In contrast to theHDTVcase theCommission refrained
from using secondary legislation and concentrated its eﬀorts on the negotiation of a
memorandumof understanding (MoU)betweenall stakeholders. TheMoUcommitted
operators to open procurement to foreign manufacturers, and manufacturers to
provide royalty free licenses and to have GSM operational by 1991. This allowed
manufacturers to deliver the new generation of GSM infrastructure equipment in a
timelywayand at reasonable cost. As a result, deploymentwas rapid, and generated
aﬀordable margins throughout the value chain. This eventually tipped the entire
European and globalmarket towards the standard. Togetherwith the next generation
UMTS standard, the GSM family of standards eventually captured 89 percent of the
international market, according to the Global Mobile Suppliers Association.
Take-home message: All stakeholders’ opinions regarding the new technology
standards have to be taken into account. For this purpose, public support should
concentrate strictly on technical problems and avoid politically motivated
preferences regarding the choice of standard. An MoU is considered a good tool for
bringing all the conﬂicting interests together and ﬁnding a mutually beneﬁcial
framework of cooperation to reduce the barriers to investment inside the value chain.
Source: Meyer (2010).
Public authorities need to ﬁnd the correct balance between socially important
standards (eg safety) and promoting R&D in the sector. It may be reasonable not to set
standards too strictly during pre-market development, in order to maintain enough
stimuli for private investment in R&D.
Often, with weak or no coordination mechanisms in place, if left to its own devices, the
market produces too little, too much, or standardisation of the wrong sort. However,
public sector involvement is only helpful if properly implemented. Additionally,
coordination amongst governments themselves is a key factor in the success of a
standard.
Conclusion: Both domestic and international, and public and private cooperation are
key to the success of an energy and transport transition. This coordination is costly and
may create a positive externality discouraging ﬁrms from entering as ﬁrst-movers.
Fragmented networks and markets may arise.
Recommendation: Public intervention into standardisation should take place when
there are weak, or no, coordination mechanisms between competing companies in a
market. Public authorities should ﬁnd the right balance when determining standards.
Domestic standardisation should take the international standards environment into
consideration. Financial subsidies to overcome coordination problems at the R&D
stage, and to mitigate the deployment barriers imposed by market competition, are a
popular form of intervention. Public-private partnerships are another avenue for facili-
tating coordination.
1.2.5 Infrastructure externality
Anew low-carbon energy and transport systemmay require a large-scale infrastructure
shift due to the use of alternative fuels. First-moving infrastructure providers face a
disadvantage because they must pay a large ﬁxed cost in order to establish
infrastructure that is the precondition for the deployment of the appliances. Late-
coming infrastructure providers may beneﬁt from the established network without
having paid the costs of building the network. As latecomers can install the latest
technology and larger units they face lower service cost. This cost-advantage allows
latecomers to cherry-pick the best locations once the network and market have been
established. Consequently, competition from latecomers may decrease prices, and
thereby decrease the proﬁt of the ﬁrst-movers. First-movers may potentially be unable
to recover their initial investments. This externality could lead to underinvestment or
no investment where competitive prices do not allow recovery of initial investments,
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and proﬁtability, in the long-term. In the past, several mechanisms to internalise the
infrastructure externality have proven successful:
The natural monopoly solution
A natural monopoly emerges when unit costs decrease with the number of clients12. In
the case of a natural monopoly the presence of an early-mover locks out any
latecomers. Water, gas, telephone, broadband and electricity distribution networks are
natural monopolies. Consequently, the early-mover can recover any initial investment
by raising prices when the network has been established. This stimulates rapid
deployment but raises the issue of excessive prices. Consequently, mature natural
monopolies are typically regulated13. Thus, the main issue for setting up a new network
with natural monopoly characteristics is the uncertainty about its future regulation.
The state monopoly approach
Some network industries are not characterised by natural monopoly characteristics,
due to the facility of competitive local provision (eg postal services, fueling stations).
Governments often create public monopolies in order to ensure country-wide access
to services and prevent ‘cherry-picking’ of the most proﬁtable locations. Typically,
governments have linked the provision of a state-monopoly to a certain (sometimes
private) provider with a universal service obligation.
The artiﬁcial monopoly/oligopoly approach
For some network technologies, infrastructure is not a natural monopoly (eg mobile
telecommunication, Facebook), ie multiple infrastructure providers can coexist and
compete for network users. Here, some companies attempt to lock in customers by
creating artiﬁcial barriers (locked SIM cards for mobile phones, non-exportable
contacts in social networks) in order to be able to pay their ﬁxed investments in
network infrastructure14. Technologies that failed to lock in customers (eg email
providers) quickly saw their proﬁt margins drop to zero. Companies that can lock in
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12. More precisely, when the long-run marginal cost is below the average cost of providing the service, no second
company has an interest to enter the market.
13. There is signiﬁcant literature on the question of if and how to optimally regulate monopolies (eg Troesken, 1996)
14. The ﬁrst electricity companies started by leasing light-bulbs to consumers (Hughes, 1977). Thus, the entire value
chain was in the hands of one company and it could set a price that covered ﬁxed and variable cost. For the initial
electriﬁcation of Manhattan, Edison essentially designed each of the components as part of an integrated system
where the resistance of the bulb ﬁlament was picked to help modulate grid load based on the number of expected
service subscribers.
customers by making interfaces incompatible have higher incentives to quickly roll-
out of their networks. So they invest more. In welfare terms this positive eﬀect is
counteracted by the long-term negative eﬀects from having a monopoly.
The consortium approach
Consortiums are another way to help ensure that the investments in network
infrastructure can be recouped. If consortiums can lock out competitors the
consortiums might internalise future beneﬁts of creating a new infrastructure. This
again might stimulate early deployment but may also have undesirable eﬀects on
competition.
The vertical integration approach
The existence of infrastructure is essential for appliance and service providers.
Consequently, they might engage in setting up the infrastructure themselves. This is
like selling camera bodies cheaply in order to be able to develop a market for lenses.
This, of course, requires that competing service/appliance providers are locked out
from the network (see artiﬁcial monopoly).
The cross-payment approach
A less-integrated approach would be for service/appliance providers to cross-subsidise
other parts of the value chain in order to create the network. In Germany, for example,
some natural gas distribution companies provide subsidies for natural gas cars in order
to develop the market (see Box 12).
The public provision approach
Finally, governments might provide the infrastructure using public funds or regulated
returns. To date much infrastructure (such as roads, railways and electricity
transmission) is provided by government in most European countries. It has to be
noted, however, that the initial technology choice in many of these cases (eg railways)
was left to the market – with governments nationalising the infrastructure only after
it appeared.
Conclusion: The huge ﬁxed cost of infrastructure construction may not be fully
recoverable in a competitive environment, due to newcomers entering and competing
without having had to pay the initial ﬁxed cost.
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Recommendation: If infrastructure development costs are not recoverable in the long
term by the ﬁrst-movers, support instruments should be considered to encourage
development of the necessary infrastructure.
1.2.6 Business exploration externality
In marketing, ﬁrst-mover advantage is the advantage gained by the initial signiﬁcant
occupant of a market segment. It may be also referred to as technological leadership.
This advantage may stem from the fact that the ﬁrst entrant can gain control of
resources or build a brand that later market entrants may not be able to match15. It is
important to note that the ﬁrst-mover advantage refers to the ﬁrst signiﬁcant company
to move into a market, not necessarily the ﬁrst company. In order for a company to try
to become a ﬁrst-mover, that company needs to work out if the overall rewards
outweigh the initial underlying risks. Sometimes, ﬁrst-movers are rewarded with huge
proﬁt margins and a monopoly-like status. Other times, the ﬁrst-mover is not able to
capitalise on its advantage, leaving opportunities for other ﬁrms to compete eﬀectively
and eﬃciently versus the earlier entrant. These companies then gain a ‘second-mover
advantage’16.
First-movers face risk in both exploring technologies (see section 1.2.2 for further
information regarding the innovation externality), and in developing a market. The ﬁrst
companies investing in a new technology face signiﬁcant risk, as their business
models are based on uncertain assumptions. If successful, implementation may
quickly be imitated by competitors. Falling margins might make it impossible for a ﬁrst-
mover to recover its initial investment at a return which is commensurate with the risks
taken. Followers clearly have some cost advantages of their own. They can, for
example, learn from the mistakes and successes of their predecessors, reducing their
own investment requirements as well as risks. In addition, followers can frequently
adopt new and more eﬃcient processes and technologies, whereas pioneers often
remain entrenched in their original ways of doing things. Finally, followers will have
lower marketing budgets for convincing the public that the (now familiar) technology
works.
According to Boulding and Christen (2001), for instance, pioneers in consumer goods
markets and industrialmarkets gained signiﬁcant sales advantages, but incurred larger
cost disadvantages. Pioneers in consumer goods had an return on investment that
was 3.78 percentage points lower than later entrants. And the ROI of ﬁrst-movers in
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15. Grant (2003).
16. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988).
the industrial goods sector was 4.24 percentage points lower than later entrants.
Pioneers were less proﬁtable than followers over the long run, controlling for all other
factors which could account for performance diﬀerences17.
In some of the standards races that have taken place, such as in personal computers,
audio recording media and video cassette recorder formats, the winner was not
necessarily the ﬁrst-mover (Box 6).
The market failure is that the commercialisation of a technology reveals information.
This is a valuable input for the decisions of policymakers, of industry and of consumers
(see lock-in due to uncertainty in section 1.2.3). In a pure market solution, the risk of
failure for a new technology is privatised, while the beneﬁt is socialised to some
degree, essentially leading to private underinvestment. Somestrategies for companies
to internalise these beneﬁts (eg coordination amongst competitors, monopolising the
new energy technology) raise competition concerns and might not be welfare-
maximising in the long term.
Conclusion: The costs of exploring, and building, new markets is high and may not be
fully recoverable given that new entrants may reduce proﬁt margins. Due to the
positive externality of business exploration, companies may be reluctant to be ﬁrst-
movers in certain sectors.
Recommendation: Policy should address the business exploration externality where
necessary, providing incentives for the exploration and development of promising
markets and technologies.
1.2.7 Insurance externality
Energy transitions are inherently subject to a high level of uncertainty. As they are
national or global shifts in the way energy is produced and consumed, they are subject
to exogenous economic, political, and even geological events. Energy transitions are
often characterised by long time horizons from initial R&D investments to full
deployment. Large investments are required throughout the process, and, due to the
uncertain nature of energy transitions, these investments carry with them a high level
of risk. Transitions are very diﬃcult to model. Predictions about the duration and speed
of transitions have seldom been accurate. For example, in terms of 2008 primary
energy share, coal was still at 20 percent versus a 5 percent share predicted by
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BOX 6: VIDEO FORMAT WAR: VHS VS. BETAMAX, OR THE CASE OF CORRECT
USE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
The classical illustration of technological lock-in was the war of the video cassette
recorder (VCR) formatswhich occurred in 1980sbetween twoﬁrst-mover companies
– Sony and JVC. Each company began by releasing two diﬀerent formats: VHS and
Betamax.
The cornerstone of VHS’s success at the early-market stage was its recording time
of two hours as compared with the one hour provided by Betamax. Sony believed
that cassette size and transportability were paramount to the consumer, and
sacriﬁced playing time in order to make smaller cassettes. Simultaneously, JVC
concentrated its eﬀorts on the availability of VCR machines by setting up rental
chains such as Radio Rentals or DER. These rental chains oﬀered an attractive choice
for consumers who did not want to spend a lot of money on a system which might
become obsolete. The ﬂourishing video cassette rental business of the 1980s was
reliant on the VHS format as a more suitable means of storing movies.
When the market matured, the wide availability of recorders and pre-recorded tapes
in VHS format became a key factor in JVC’s victory, allowing it to become an absolute
market leader. Although Betamax initially owned 100 percent of the market, in 1975,
the perceived value of longer recording times eventually tipped the balance in favour
of VHS. Sony, as the ﬁrst producer to oﬀer their technology, thought it would be able
to establish Betamax as the leading format. This kind of lock-in failed for Sony, but
succeeded for JVC. For thirty years, JVC dominated the home market with their VHS,
Super VHS and VHS-Compact formats, and collected billions in royalty payments.
Take-home messages:
• First-movers do not necessarily prevail.
• Consumer preferences may tip the scale in a competition between similar
technologies. Attention should be paid to accurate evaluation of what aspects of
the technology are most important to consumers.
• Investment in downstream (retail) suppliers may help resolve the chicken-and-
egg problem.
Sources: Besen and Farrell (1994), Leibowitz and Margolis (1995).
Marchetti in 1970, and the23percent share of natural gaswas far below the60percent
predicted (Smil 2010). Predictions even over the course of 40 years are not reliable
even though time horizons for energy transitions are very long18.
Despite the uncertainty of success for individual energy transitions, it is apparent that
we are currently at the brink of a new era in energy. A drastic change in the way we
produce and consume energy must occur in order to avert a global environmental
crisis. The Stern Review (2006) estimates the cost of inaction (with respect to climate
change) to be equivalent to losing at least 5 percent of global GDP per annum now and
forever, possibly rising to 20 percent if including other risks and impacts19.
It is diﬃcult to know, at the current stage, the cost-eﬀectiveness or feasibility of
diﬀerent green technologies. Early perceptions of nuclear as ‘too cheap to meter’ have
been incorrect; nuclear is much more expensive than predicted (Cohn, 1997).
Similarly, the costs of new technologies may change due to materials availability (eg
lithium for batteries, platinum for fuel cell membranes) technological constraints
(nuclear fusion) or changing public acceptability (carbon sequestration, nuclear, shale
gas). Attempts to predict aﬀordability have sometimes included the use of learning
curves – savings in cost due to learning-by-doing and R&D. R&D investments create
steeper learning curves (higher cost savings) but their actual impact is diﬃcult to
measure due to the lack of availability of private data. Learning curves may be a way
to predict future costs but are an imperfect tool as much depends on external factors
unrelated to learning. In addition, technologies may have diﬀerently-sloped curves
and thus some technologies which appear currently expensive may be cheaper in the
long run, whereas some immediately viable technologies may have learning curves
that level out and will thus remain expensive.
An energy transition for mitigating GHG emissions will require decisions on both public
and private investment. High levels of uncertainty, coupled with positive network
externalities, may lead individual ﬁrms to converge on a technology or energy system
that proves suboptimal ex post. Rational agents may behave optimally by copying the
behaviour of others in order to reduce risk, as opposed to acting solely on the basis of
their own information, due to an information cascade eﬀect. This is called herding
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18. Energy transitions are dynamic in nature, and often subject to unforeseeable/unpredictable events (eg the German
reaction to the Fukushima accident).
19. This has been a widely debated report, for example, Nordhaus’ response (Nordhaus, 2007) strongly questions the
discounting method used in the review. However, there is growing concern about the environmental impacts of
GHG emissions, as evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 2050 goals, and that there will be a huge cost
incurred by inaction.
behaviour and can occur when there is uncertainty and imperfect information
(Bikhchandani et al, 1992). Herding to a single technology might make it very costly
for society if this technology proves to be an ineﬃcient or insuﬃcient solution to meet
emissions targets20. Thus, public intervention to discourage herding and to nurture
alternative technologies, as an insurance against the risky nature of any energy
transition, might increase expected welfare.
Energy security literature asserts that portfolio diversiﬁcation is important in the
maintenance of current energy security and fuel mix portfolios for individual
companies (Roques et al, 2008; Lesbirel, 2004). The heavy reliance of some countries
on a single technology (eg France on nuclear, Ukraine on gas) poses energy security
risks. Investments in new energies and future energy systems should similarly adopt
a portfolio approach. Investment in a backstop technology may prove to provide a
huge positive insurance externality in the case that the chosen primary technology
fails. The beneﬁts of this externality would not be automatically internalised. This is
an opportunity for the development of policy instruments to encourage investment in
backstop technologies. Although it is expensive to invest in the development of new
technologies as an insurance policy, the potential cost savings, in the event that a
backstop technology is needed, are huge and there is risk of substantial cost in not
doing so.
Conclusion: Diversiﬁed investment in alternative technologies may provide an
insurance against failure of primary technologies in meeting the energy and climate
challenge.
Recommendation: Governments should adopt a long-term perspective in technology
investments and diversify support over technology portfolios, possibly including
investments in backstop technologies.
1.2.8 Industrial policy externality
From cost to beneﬁt: can new energy and transport technology policy generate jobs
and growth?
Inventing, building and deploying the infrastructure and capital required for a new low-
emission energy and transport system presents a range of opportunities to generate
employment, renew ﬁrm competitiveness in existing sectors, and foster ﬁrm
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20. See section 1.2.3 for further information regarding possible path dependency and lock-in.
competitiveness in new sectors. These opportunities have not escaped the notice of
national and regional governments. But most climate policy has emphasised
minimising the costs of transition to a low-emissions transport system. States hoping
to capitalise on that transition to generate employment and technological leadership
face a very diﬀerent set of challenges.
Modern energy and transport systems provide an array of sophisticated services to
industrial economies. At present, it doesn’t appear that a low-emissions transport
system would make substantial improvements to these services. Rather, it seeks to
continue to provide the same services without generating the damaging by-products.
Thus the introduction of a new transport system does not oﬀer to radically transform
an array of economic domains in the way that the introduction of the railways or the
private car did. This reality restricts the potential economic beneﬁts that states may
capture during the transition process itself.
As Huberty et al (2011) have shown, these beneﬁts come down to essentially three
domains:
1. Creation of domestic jobs to build and operate the new energy and transport
infrastructure;
2. Creation of domestic jobs to manufacture the capital equipment required to replace
the old fossil fuel-based capital stock;
3. Creation of globally-competitive ﬁrms in ‘green’ export markets through domestic
investments in research, development and deployment of new goods.
This section discusses each of these in brief. All three of these potential beneﬁts from
the adoption of low-emissions transport networks pose novel challenges for transport
policy. In particular, translating domestic market growth into command of global export
markets traps policymakers between two dilemmas of network selection. Domestic-
ally, the choice of the optimum network may require a lengthy process of experi-
mentation to guard against the risks of network lock-in discussed above. But abroad,
command of export markets requires that states position their industries to sell into
global network standards. Balancing the optimum choice of networks at home with
inﬂuence on global standards and access to export markets abroad becomes the
primary challenge for industrial policy. But, as we shall argue, this challenge diﬀers
by state size and existing industrial capacity, further complicating the dilemma posed
by green industrial policy for the state and ﬁrms alike.
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Job creation at home: limits to duration and size
Transport and energy systems in advanced industrial economies are largely already
built, and demand for new capacity grows slowly. In that context, domestic jobs from
the creation of a low-emissions energy system can come in two forms. In the initial
phase, the replacement of signiﬁcant network infrastructure can create jobs in sectors
such as construction and services. Since these jobs are in non-traded sectors, they
will almost certainly appear. However, they are necessarily time-limited. With the
completion of infrastructure replacement, we should expect the labour demands from
the energy and transport sector to return to the pre-replacement equilibrium.
Furthermore, these jobs will arrive regardless of the particular kind of technology
eventually chosen for the replacement. Because they are not exposed to international
competition, jobs in these sectors pose relatively few challenges to the state beyond
the general problem of inducing and managing the energy and transportation systems
transition.
States may also wish to keep some or all of the jobs associated with capital goods
manufacture for infrastructure and appliance replacement at home. This poses far
greater challenges to industrial policy. Creating high-productivity manufacturing jobs
in new energy and transport technologies is only justiﬁed by substantial demand for
these products. Small states lack the economies of scale required to justify investment
in large segments of the value chain– they simply lack the volume of demand required
to pay those investments back. Likewise, states poorly positioned in the core
technologies and industrial capabilities required to build either the components of a
low-emissions energy and transport system, or act as systems integrators for things
like low-emissions automobiles, face very signiﬁcant start-up costs at the sector level,
apart from the costs to invent, pilot and deploy low-emissions technologies.
The opportunities for job creation based on domestic markets alone are thus limited in
both time and space. Most economies will capture jobs in non-traded sectors like
construction as they replace the infrastructure of today’s fossil fuel energy and
transport system with low-emissions substitutes. But capturing high-productivity,
high-technology manufacturing jobs to supply the capital goods required will require
that states make careful choices about the scope and position of their investments in
the value chain that will supply those goods.
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Capturing export markets abroad: learning-by-doing, international standards, and
the risks of network mismatch
The limits to domesticmarkets in all but the largest economieshave encouraged states
to look to export markets as sources of ‘green growth’. If national economies can trans-
late domestic expertise in new low-emissions energy and transport technology into
international competitiveness, export-ledmarket growth can create a rangeof domestic
beneﬁts through access to markets much larger than domestic demand alone.
The history of export-led market growth provides some evidence that national policy
can generate signiﬁcant returns. As Box 7 shows, the experience with ‘green’ goods
such as wind turbines has shown that aggressive domestic market expansion in low-
emissions goods can generate signiﬁcant ‘learning-by-doing’ beneﬁts for domestic
ﬁrms. In many industries, the only way to become truly skilled at designing, building
and deploying new technological systems is to actually design, build and deploy them.
Promoting the domestic growth of low-emissions ﬂeets of technologies such as
hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles may generate substantial opportunities for
domestic ﬁrms to gain valuable knowledge about how new technologies perform under
real-world conditions. Thismay give themadvantages in international markets, through
both technological expertise and overall industrial productivity, that translates into
international competitiveness and export-led growth.
However, translating domestic market growth into international competitiveness poses
a major dilemma for industrial policy when network technologies are involved. As the
previous sections have discussed, externalities can create substantial technological
inertia. Overcoming that inertia to promote a low-emissions energy and transport
system may require states to support simultaneous increases in both the demand for
low-emissions energy and transport options like hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and the
supply of the corresponding network services. But in doing so, states face the
challenge of ensuring that national economies do not become locked into early and
perhaps sub-optimal technology choices. Thus promotion of competition early on, and
piloting of new transport systems before major commitments are made, are warranted
as means to try and minimise these risks.
But translating domestic expertise into export-led growth requires very diﬀerent
actions. Access to export markets in network technologies depends on the
compatibility of national ﬁrm products with the network standards chosen abroad.
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between domestic and foreign choices in this regard may
radically limit the possibility of capturing export beneﬁts through improved ﬁrm
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
32
competitiveness. This is not an idle concern. As Box 3 shows, Japan has long had far
more advanced cellular technology than the rest of the world. But early state and
market incentives left Japan with a suite of network technologies wholly incompatible
with those of its trading partners. Thus despite its technological excellence, Japan
failed to capitalise on domestic learning-by-doing experience, and lost out to
competitors from Scandinavia, Korea and the United States.
Whether states can inﬂuence the choices of their trading partners in their own favour
depends on both market and non-market factors. Suﬃciently large markets may have
implicit standards-setting authority merely because of the size of their domestic
demand. In this sense, the United States commanded signiﬁcant authority in the
semiconductor and communications network markets not only because it was a ﬁrst
mover in those technologies, but also because it constituted the largest single market
for them. It could thus export not just the technologies, but also the standards that
went with them.
Absent either market power or ﬁrst-mover advantages, states may ﬁnd that they can
best capitalise on export-led market growth through command of universal niches in
emerging markets. Qualcomm Corporation is a particularly successful example of this
kind of strategy. Through both aggressive R&Dandpatent acquisition, Qualcommcame
to commandalmost 50percent of the patent portfolio required to build complete CDMA-
based cellular phones21. The revenue from that portfolio has persisted through several
generations of change in the cellular markets, but Qualcomm has maintained its
revenue stream through both ﬁrst-mover advantage and control over technological
niches. States lacking the size, industrial capacity or political power to shape
international standards in their favour may ﬁnd that niche strategies oﬀer more
promising avenues for industrial policy than pursuit of the low-emissions energy and
transport sector as a whole.
Regardless of what the speciﬁc answer here is, however, we emphasise that capturing
international beneﬁts from early adoption poses a direct challenge to conventional
climate policy. Carbon pricing, we should remember, is attractive because it relieves the
state of the burden of technological choice. Rather, the choices are supposed to emerge
from the change in relative prices brought about by the carbon price itself. But nothing
about that process provides the state with tools to aﬀect or set the choice of network
standards at home, nor to assure that those standards either dictate or are compatible
with standards in emerging export markets abroad.
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21. CDMA: code division multiple access.
Industrial policy in the fuel cell sector
The dilemma states face, between domestic deployment and capture of international
markets, challenges conventional policy recommendations. But that does not mean,
conversely, that governments should simply pick and subsidise a standard without
further information. Instead, the challenge for policy is how best to establish early
indicators of optimal network choice, in a period of international ﬂux, and then move
quickly to deployment and potential inﬂuence over standards adoption abroad.
For fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV), the control of innovation and production capacity
appears to come down to two important questions of technological, operational and
standards control:
1. Who commands an early lead in fuel cell innovation? Today, most innovation in
fuel cell technologies originates from the US, Canada, Japan and Germany. From
1998-2006, these four countries generated 90 percent of all fuel cell patents
granted by the United States Patent and Trade Oﬃce.
2. Who commands an early lead in automotive systems integration? The standards-
setting problem is particularly acute at the level of systems integration, where
component technologies are built up into FCEVs. Here, the dominant auto manu-
facturers in the US, Japan and Germany clearly hold a major technological and
logistical lead. The only likely challengers at present are Korea’s rapidly emerging
global automobile industry, and China’s nascent but ambitious (and heavily state-
supported) sector.
For FCEV, it remains to be seen if the US, Japanese and German ﬁrms can capitalise on
domestic innovation systems to gain an early lead in the expertise required to integrate
fuel cells into viable personal transport vehicles. Doing so without exposing national
economies to the risk of lock-in to suboptimal networks will require states to proceed
rapidly but carefully in network evaluation. How best to do so in an economical fashion
becomes the core challenge.
Here, Farrel et al (2003) have proposed that the fuel-cell industry capitalise on niche
networks that still oﬀer signiﬁcant scale. The learning captured in those networks can
provide information subsidies to the later deployment of hydrogen fuel cell electric
vehicles, act as a proving ground for new network standards and technologies, and do
so without the risk of large-scale failure that might doom both future government policy
initiatives and consumer enthusiasm for FCEVs.
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This would imply that the fuel-cell industry should seek a range of trial markets, such
as medium-distance goods transport, whose properties allow the deployment of a
more limited, less full-featured network. These markets, moreover, are typically quite
heavy polluters (given their reliance on heavy diesel fuel), and thus represent
attractive targets for emissions mitigation. They thus pose substantially fewer risks
to either government policymakers or to the fuel-cell industry itself.
In practice, the EU and its member states have already done much of this. Particularly
in the case of public transport, local and regional governments have used government
purchasing to expand FCEV ﬂeets and install networks of refuelling stations at modest
scale. Expanding on those initiatives to include other transportation niches thus
represents a natural and promising policy direction for informing network choice.
But the EU should continue to maintain vigilance about the challenge of international
competition. The problem of state size and international standards-setting would
suggest that the EU should converge on a single standard for FCEV and promote that
standard both domestically – to secure learning-by-doing beneﬁts – and
internationally, to secure access to externalmarkets. But in doing so, it will face intense
competition from large national markets in China, Japan and the United States. China
in particular has the potential to deploy new vehicle technology much more rapidly
than the EU or US, given the expected growth of its vehicle market over the next several
decades. Ensuring that EU FCEV ﬁrms and supply chains are not locked out of global
markets that converge on Chinese or American standards poses a particularly diﬃcult
policy challenge that is separate from the problem of domestic deployment. But it is
critical to resolve this challenge if the EU is to capture narrow economic beneﬁts from
its pursuit of comparative advantage in new FCEV technologies and systems.
In resolving the tension between domestic and international competitiveness,
however, the EU and its member states should keep in mind that failure can come from
other sources than unfavourable developments in international standards. The
isolation of Japanese cellular phone ﬁrms emerged in part from how market
competition shaped ﬁrm choices. But it also came apart because of how the choices
of Japanese regulatory bodies aﬀected cellular standard-setting, market competition
and ﬁrm investment choices.
Furthermore, the rapid development of new domestic sectors may lead to near-term
distortion of labour and capital markets, with negative eﬀects for other high-
productivity sectors. The goal of FCEV development is not, of course, the replacement
but rather the supplementing of employment in sectors with related skills. Pulling
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skilled labour out of highly competitive sectors to pursue FCEV may put those sectors
at a disadvantage, in pursuit of international advantages in highly risky network
technologies.
Finally, competitiveness is not comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is a
function of relative productivity, not raw sales. Highly competitive ﬁrms may still prove
enormously vulnerable to international competition frombetter-positioned economies,
particularly if dependent on state subsidies or other forms of support. That a country
can use domestic deployment of a new low-emissions energy and transport sector to
create internationally competitive ﬁrms does not make that a necessarily optimal
strategy, particularly if it costs the broader economy competitiveness elsewhere.
Capitalising on environmental policy to create economic opportunity and growth
requires not just careful attention to the opportunities of these new sectors and
technologies, but to the enduring risks of market distortion and state action.
Conclusion: Domestic deployment of new energy and transport technologies does not
promise signiﬁcant new employment opportunities. However, early-movers with large
markets are often able to set global standards that help them to secure a competitive
advantage in growing new industries with high value-added. Government support to
establish corresponding new markets requires costly policy choices with signiﬁcant
uncertainty.
Recommendation: In their industrial policy eﬀorts governments should focus on
sectors were they can build on prior strength. To identify potential targets, growing out
of niches is a relatively cheap approach to gathering information on the viability of a
technology. Governments should avoid costly support that just shifts employment
from one promising (market-driven) sector to another.
1.3 Conclusion
Transforming the energy and transport system is essential to meet European climate
targets. Side-beneﬁts such as reduced dependence on fossil fuel imports and lower
local noise and pollution emissions, as well as industrial policy motives make this
transformation even more beneﬁcial.
Because of a number of market failures, private actors will not carry out this transition
on their own. The social beneﬁts of individual carbon mitigation, innovation, initial
deployment of green technologies and infrastructure are not properly compensated.
Thus, the public sector is needed to adjust the private incentives.
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BOX 7: LEARNING-BY-DOING IN THE WIND POWER SECTOR
Denmark has enormous weight in the global wind power industry. Domestic ﬁrms
such as Vestas have achieved this kind of global leadership even as they have been
challenged by industrial giants in Germany and the United States. The Danish
experience provides a valuable lesson in translating domestic adoption of low-
emissions technologies into global comparative advantage.
As Heymann (1998) shows, the Danish wind sector had far greater success, far
earlier on, than either American or German ﬁrms. Furthermore, it also spent less on
pure research and development. Instead, while both American and German ﬁrms
spent time and money on laboratory research into wind turbine component design,
Danish ﬁrms instead chose to actually go out and build turbines. In practice, it turned
out that lab-optimised turbine designs were poorly suited to actual operating
conditions. By comparison, Danish ﬁrms made marginal, continuous improvements
to their turbines based on real-world data, data unavailable to ﬁrms that had not
started early deployment.
Denmark has continued to capitalise on the process of learning-by-doing. As the
international wind turbine sector has become more competitive, Denmark’s initial
lead has eroded. But Denmark has now one of the few high-wind-energy electricity
systems, making it an ideal testing ground for the next phase of intermittent
generation technologies. Once again, it has capitalised on its ﬁrst-mover domestic
status as a laboratory for building and operating successful networked systems.
Take-home message: Aggressive domestic market expansion in low-emissions
goods can generate signiﬁcant ‘learning-by-doing’ beneﬁts. In many industries, the
only way to become truly skilled at designing, building and deploying new
technological systems is to actually design, build, and deploy them.
Sources: Heymann (1998), Aarhus Kommune (2010).
2 Analysis of commercial and
policy gaps: the case of fuel
cell electric vehicles
Although the wheels of a transport-energy transition are in motion, the policies fuelling
the shift to a low-carbon transport and energy sector are disjointed and insuﬃcient to
facilitate a speedy transition. To illustrate the gaps in the current policies supporting
the transport-energy transition, we perform a mapping of current policies to the
externalities identiﬁed in chapter 1, in the context of a potential entrant technology.
We focus on the example of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) as the potential
breakthrough technology. FCEVs are an interesting case as the transition to such a
technology would suﬀer from most of the impediments described in chapter 1. FCEVs
are not competitive against incumbent technologies, for cost reasons, and require
large-scale downstream changes to become commercially viable. However, FCEVs are
candidates for replacing internal combustion-engine cars because they oﬀer a
combination of low-carbon emissions22 with a range and level of comfort comparable
to conventional cars. They have been both the beneﬁciaries and victims of fads (being
highly promoted for a time, and then facing steeper competition more recently, though
the ‘best’ technology was not and is still not clear). FCEVs still have the potential to
become a breakthrough low-carbon transport technology, among several others.
Additionally, FCEVs are more sensitive to the infrastructure externality and path
dependencies than technologies such as battery electric vehicles (BEVs), and would
serve better for illustrating the problems faced by similarly infrastructure-sensitive
technologies23. We will examine how current policies may support or hinder a
hypothetical transition to this technology, so as to highlight more tangibly the
problems facing most, if not all, potential alternative transport technologies.
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22. This only holds if a low-carbon production mix is used to generate the hydrogen fuel.
23. Hybridisation and a large niche market (suburban commuters) could allow an initial deployment of battery electric
vehicles without substantial public infrastructure investment.
However, massive market penetration is currently constrained by technical short-
comings, high cost and many of the aforementioned market failures. In the following
sections, we will analyse the key factors required for the success of this technology,
identify the techno-commercial gap by comparing corresponding target values to the
present situation, catalogue the current policies in place and identify the potential
policy gaps which would need to be addressed.
2.1 Identifying the relevant factors for success of FCEVs
The ﬁrst step in the gap analysis consists of identifying the relevant factors necessary
for FCEVs to becomea competitive technology option. Based on factors identiﬁed in the
existing literature, the key challenges to a FCEV rollout were mapped and grouped into
the following categories:
1. Propulsion technology (technical requirements, cost development of key com-
ponents);
2. Infrastructure and fuel (infrastructure demand, fuel cost development);
3. Framework factors (norms, technical standards, skills and qualiﬁcations);
4. Consumer acceptance (willingness to pay the diﬀerence with established tech-
nologies, market share potential).
Furthermore, analysis of the literature delivered insights into the interdependencies
of the factors. For example, the cost development of the propulsion technology will
have a vital impact on consumer acceptance of FCEVs and the achievable futuremarket
share. The number of cars sold and produced has an impact on how quickly scale
economies and learning-by-doing eﬀects lead to cost reductions. However, the market
share achieved has an impact on the proﬁtability and supply of fuel station infra-
structure, and the supply of infrastructure, in turn, has an impact on the purchase
decision of the consumer. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the factors
identiﬁed, possible indicators to track them, and selected linkages.
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
39
Fi
gu
re
1:
Ov
er
vi
ew
of
id
en
tiﬁ
ed
su
cc
es
s
fa
ct
or
s
an
d
re
le
va
nt
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
in
di
ca
to
rs
So
ur
ce
:E
SM
T(
20
11
).
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
40
Understanding these interdependencies and modelling them to identify potential gaps
between the factor targets and the model predictions is the research objective of this
chapter.
In each of the following sections, we brieﬂy discuss the relevant factors, suitable
progress indicators, required milestones, time lines and any mismatch between target
states and business-as-usual development.
In this section, we considerwhich technical factors determine the progress of hydrogen
fuel cell propulsion technology towards becoming a competitive alternative to existing
and emerging technologies. These include:
1. Technological pre-conditions (range, tank capacity, fuel cell stack life time, fuel cell
system eﬃciency);
2. Cost development of key components (fuel cell stack costs, battery costs).
2.1.1 A model-based approach to detecting the technological and commercial gaps
At the centre of the gap analysis are two questions: (1) what conditions are needed for
fuel cell electric vehicles to become a successful technology and (2) how much of
these will the market provide autonomously in the business-as-usual case without
policy intervention? To answer those questions we use a model based approach. It
utilises the Market Model Electric Mobility (MMEM)–a simulation tool developed by the
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT, 2011). While the underlying
assumptions are based on the German car market, the results can generally be
transferred to the European context (see the Appendix for more information on the
modelling approach).
Speciﬁcally, to answer the two key questions, we simulated the following scenarios:
1. The ‘industry forecast scenario’ in which we simulate a world where the main
inputs such as FCEV production costs, hydrogen costs and infrastructure supply
take the values of the industry forecasts made in McKinsey & Company (2010)
report, A portfolio of power-trains for Europe: a fact-based analysis. We then
estimate the achievable market shares where all the targets and milestones are
met, in line with the requirements stated by the stakeholders.
2. However, meeting the targets from the McKinsey & Company (2010) study is by no
means assured and depends on a number of factors. Therefore, in comparison to
the ‘industry forecast scenario’, the ‘business-as-usual scenario’ (BAU) explores
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what autonomousdevelopmentmight occur. That is, howwill critical factors such as
theproduction costs of fuel and vehicles, infrastructure supply and, in consequence,
the market uptake of FCEVs, develop without any policy intervention? For the
forecasts to be realistic, the modelling approach and assumptions must reﬂect the
interdependencies between the success factors for a FCEV roll-out (this is illustrated
in Figure1). For example, the infrastructure supply should reﬂect howmanycharging
stations can be operated proﬁtably given the number FCEVs on the market. The
number of charging stations, in turn, should inﬂuence car buyers’ willingness to pay
and, therefore, the market share achievable. These interdependencies are
implemented in MMEM, the model used to simulate the two scenarios.
To provide a quick overview, Table 1 summarises the assumptions made, and
approaches used, in the two scenarios.
Table 1: Comparison BAU and industry forecast scenario approach and assumptions
Indicator BAU modelling approach Industry forecast scenario
2020 2030
Hydrogen fuel production costs [€/kg] Two-Factor-Learning curve approach -4.5 -4.0
Hydrogen vehicle cost Two-Factor-Learning curve approach -29 -25
components [€1000s/vehicle]
Infrastructure supply [% station density] Break-Even-Model -1.5% 9%
Source: ESMT (2011), McKinsey & Company (2010).
For each of the factors identiﬁed, we ﬁrst deﬁne the industry forecast scenario – ie
what targets and milestones need to be met based on the literature review and
stakeholder views. Secondly, we model the BAU scenario to derive an estimate of how
much development is likely to occur without any policy intervention. Any discrepan-
cies between the two scenarios can be interpreted as the technological-commercial
gap. This gap will be particularly useful when comparing consumer acceptance of
FCEVs in the two scenarios (see section 2.2.1).
2.1.2 Technical pre-conditions for commercial deployment of hydrogen vehicles
Hydrogen-poweredcars relyona fundamentallynewdrive-train technology. Assuch, the
technology faces substantial challenges when compared with other alternative vehicle
technologies. Thesechallengesneed tobe resolvedbefore FCEVsareable toachieveany
signiﬁcantmarketpotential or commercial readiness. Themost relevant technologicalpre-
conditions are range, tank capacity and design, fuel cell life time and net eﬃciency.
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Currently, tank capacity and design seems to be the main challenge to the commercial
deployment of hydrogen cars. Indeed, in order to achieve ranges of over 300 kilo-
metres per reﬁlling, the storage tank needs hold around 4-6 kg of hydrogen (Blesl et
al, 2009). However, the technology–700bar high-pressure hydrogen tanks– required
to achieve such capacity carries with it a signiﬁcant cost and weight impact. Indeed,
the prerequisite for commercial use is a signiﬁcant reduction in the cost of hydrogen
storage (Roads2HyCom, 2009). Thus, prior to any deployment, tank capacity –
measured in kilogrammes of hydrogen stored – needs to achieve the target of 4-6 kg
while allowing for the vehicle shapes of all segments.
A similar technical challenge has been the fuel cell stack lifetime. For the technology
to become commercially viable, fuel cell system lifetime needs to be comparable with
the lifetime of a conventional engine. While this has been an issue in the past, recent
tests and pilots have shown an improvement in durability. The industry now claims a
stack lifetime of around 115,000 km and expects this to increase to 180,000 km for
the commercial launch in 2015 (McKinsey & Company, 2010).
Finally, the energy eﬃciency of the fuel-cell system is another critical issue. TheUnited
States Department of Energy has set a target of 60 percent net eﬃciency. This would
be roughly twice the eﬃciency of conventional gasoline internal combustion engines.
Achieving this target is also important given the costs and technical constraints of
storing large amounts of hydrogen. As of 2007, a pilot study of 77 ﬁrst generation fuel-
cell vehicles found that they achieved 53-58 percent net eﬃciency (NREL, 2007). As
such, the energy eﬃciency target is likely to be met.
The studies and industry forecasts reviewed indicate that these technological
barriers can probably be overcome by 2015. This shifts the focus from the technical
factors related to key components to achieving sufﬁcient cost reductions.
2.1.3 Cost development of key components
Using hydrogen to propel electric vehicles requires that an electro-chemical device
turn hydrogen into electric energy. The key components of such a fuel cell system are:
• The fuel cell stack;
• Peripherycomponents (air compressors, fuel reformers,pumps, coolingsystems,etc);
• Electrical systems (electric engine, control electronics);
• Battery;
• Hydrogen tank.
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Common characteristics of these components are their complexity and novelty. The
technology is as yet untested, and produced in low numbers in unautomated
processes. Consequently, it is expensive. In order to present a viable alternative
propulsion technology, the production costs of fuel-cell systems need to fall
substantially.
A decline in production costs, and in the purchase price, would require production of
FCEVs in signiﬁcant numbers. Scale economies and learning-by-doing eﬀects can be
utilised to lower the price. Additionally, investments in research and development are
needed to lower production costs via technological advancement. Given the
importance of key component cost development to the commercial success of FCEVs,
the evolution of costs needs to be tracked closely via suitable indicators. The following
section explores the status quo and the required cost developments for the major
components of FCEVs.
Status quo and forecast cost reductions
Fuel cells are not yet being produced on an industrial scale. Unsurprisingly, the costs
of fuel cell stacks are still very high – between €300-500 per kilowatt delivered. For a
compact car with a 75 kilowatt fuel cell, the cost of the fuel cell system would exceed
€30,000 per vehicle.
Table 2: Forecast fuel-cell system costs, €/kw
2010 2015 2020 2030
HyWays (2008) n/a n/a 100 50
Blesl et al (2009) 600 n/a 150 40
Industry Forecast 500 110 43 43
Sources: Blesl et al (2009), Roads2HyCom (2009), McKinsey & Company (2010).
While the available forecasts are conﬂicting regarding the extent and speed of the
achievable cost reduction, the studies reviewed all expect that costs could fall to €40-
50 per kilowatt in the medium term if fuel-cell systems are produced on an industrial
scale24 (see Table 2). This would represent an almost 90 percent decline in the
production costs of fuel-cell stacks.
A second cost component and success factor for FCEVs is the production cost of the
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24. For an informative review of cost development see for example Blesl et al (2009).
hydrogen tank. Indeed, given the low mass-energy ratio and transient nature of
hydrogen fuel, storing a suﬃcient amount of it presents a signiﬁcant technical
challenge (Roads2HyCom, 2009). Only 700 bar tanks would provide the storage
capacity needed for FCEVs to exceed ranges of 300 kilometres per reﬁll. The costs of
energy-storage systems are still very high and need to be reduced through invest-
ments in research and through learning-by-doing eﬀects. Reﬂecting technical
uncertainties, forecasts of cost developments in the literature are vague. Blesl et al
(2009) suggest current production costs of around €775 per kg tank capacity and
consider a cost decline to €270 realistic. We use this forecast as our benchmark for the
required cost decline for hydrogen tanks.
Other relevant cost components of FCEVs, which need to come down in order for the
purchase price to become competitive against competing propulsion technologies,
are the costs of the electric engines, control electronics and battery costs. These
components are common to other electric propulsion technologies and one can expect
spillover eﬀects from a commercial deployment of plug-in hybrid, range extender and
battery electric vehicles. Indeed, with mild hybrid cars already being produced in
signiﬁcant numbers, cost reductions in this area have already taken place and are
likely to continue well ahead of those of actual fuel cell components. We expect battery
cost to fall signiﬁcantly from the €700-800 per kWh to below €300 per kWh over the
next decade, reﬂecting the increasing market share of electric vehicles and invest-
ments in research and development. This is based on expectations from battery
industry stakeholders expressed during the ‘National Platform Electric mobility (NPE)’
consultation process conducted in Germany in 2010 and 2011 (Nationale Plattform
Elektromobilität, 2010). We will use this forecast as our industry forecast scenario for
battery cost development.
Can cost reductions be achieved in the BAU case?
Cost reductions on the scale required to meet the targets expressed by industry and
literature can only be achieved through substantial investments in new production
and material technologies. Furthermore, only production on an industrial scale is likely
to achieve the learning-by-doing eﬀects required. We therefore modelled the extent
of cost reductions possible in diﬀerent scenarios, in order to identify whether cost-
reduction targets can be achieved. The model is based on a two-factor-learning-curve
approach for estimating how costs will develop in response to increasing production
capacity and accumulated learning (see Box 8). The cost decline of the FCEV
components determines the actual purchase prices of hydrogen vehicles and their
competitiveness. The feedback loop between market uptake and learning-by-doing is
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inherently considered in our modelling approach, and allows for establishing how a
slower or faster market uptake may impact cost declines and vice versa (see also
section 2.2.1 for a short description of the simulation tool used).
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BOX 8: USING TWO-FACTOR-LEARNING CURVES TO SIMULATE COST
DEVELOPMENTS OF KEY FCEV COMPONENTS
Understanding the future technical progress of innovations is crucial when
discussing the prospects of innovative propulsion technologies. In the context of
FCEVs, innovation theory, using learning curves, can shed light on the technical
change process and the impact on unit costs. The concept of learning as a distinct
source of technical change was presented in Wright (1936) and Arrow (1962), and
is often called learning-by doing. Technical change through learning eﬀects is
generally derived from learning curves. Progress is typically measured in terms of
the reduction in unit cost as a function of experience gained from the increase in
cumulative capacity or output (Jamasb, 2007).
Two-factor learning curves reﬂect the fact that both capacity deployment and R&D
may impact the rate of technical progress and cost reduction. Learning eﬀects can
therefore stem from learning-by-doing or learning-by-research. The following formula
summarises the approach:
With Qt denoting cumulative production in the current period, Rt cumulative
research expenditure, C the unit costs, and ε the share of non-learning cost (for
example raw materials). αt and βt are the learning-by-doing and learning-by-
research cost reduction coeﬃcients. They reﬂect the cost reduction eﬀect which
additional capacity or R&D expenditure can induce.
Learning curves are not an economic law but an empirically observed relationship.
Figure 2 depicts an illustrative example of how the approach can be used to predict
cost development for batteries.
Thus, past relationships between the cumulative number of units produced, R&D
expenditure and unit costs can be used to forecast the possible cost trajectories of
other technologies. Clearly, such an approach is inherently uncertain and can only
be indicative. Nevertheless it is a useful tool for modelling cost developments under
diﬀerent assumptions.
Qt −αt Rt −βt
Ct = (1−ε)Co — — +(ε)Co(Q0) (R0)
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Figure 2: Two-factor-learning-curve for battery costs
Source: ESMT (2011), based on Blesl (2004).
We mostly use the industry assumptions on learning rates reported in McKinsey &
Company (2010) for our modelling purposes.
Table 3: Learning rate assumptions
Learning by doing rate Learning by research rate**
FC cost component 15%* 20%
EV typical components 10%* 20%
Battery costs 15%** 20%
Hydrogen fuel production costs 5%* 20%
Sources: * McKinsey & Company (2010), ** based on Jamasb (2007).
Clearly, the underlying assumptions about learning rates (and initial production
experience) have a signiﬁcant impact on the trajectory of the learning curve and the
cost reductions that can be achieved with increasing market penetration. A learning
rate of 15 percent suggests that each doubling of cumulative production reduces
(the learning part of) unit costs by 15 percent.
Sources: Jamasb (2007), Blesl (2004).
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The model results suggest that, in the business as usual scenario, the costs of the
main components will not decline as quickly as required to meet stated targets and
milestones. This is the result of the combined eﬀect of low market penetration and a
lack of R&D investment. With the costs of key components declining less than
necessary to meet the industry forecast scenario, purchase costs (excluding tax and
margins) of FCEVS will fall less than what is deemed necessary for successful market
deployment (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Production costs BAU vs. industry forecast scenario, €/vehicle
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
Amore detailed look at the cost development of fuel-cell stacks underlines the negative
feedback loop between a slow decline in costs and a slow uptake (see Figure 4).
However, even the achievement of an optimistic market uptake (around 25 percent of
new registrations by 2050 – one of the targets voiced by stakeholders) does not lead
to the cost decline deemed necessary for the purchase price to become competitive
in the medium term. This is not surprising as the cost reductions are unlikely to be
achieved through capacity increases alone. As the example in Box 8 shows, R&D-
induced cost reductions, especially in the pre- and early-commercialisation phases,
have a role to play in shifting the cost curve downwards.
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Figure 4: Cost development fuel cell stacks, €/kw
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
The status quo for fuel-cell stack costs reﬂects the early pre-commercialisation phase
of the technology. Current prototypes are being produced manually, leading to very
high production costs. While this means that there is a huge potential for cost
reduction, realising it relies on suﬃcient scale of production. Additionally, investments
in research, to develop eﬃcient material use and production methods, are required to
provide suﬃciently low production costs for an initial commercial deployment in the
medium term. It is uncertain though if the market will autonomously reach the cost
reductions required. In particular, there is a large gap between target costs and the
cost outcomes in the BAU case, suggesting that the targets will be missed. Given the
overall cost share of this component, the gap will signiﬁcantly impact the purchase
price of FCEVs, and may impede the market-share growth of the technology. Our
analysis suggests that reducing the costs in line with industry forecasts would require
a concerted approach.
Table 4: Cost development of key component: summary of success factors and
suggested progress indicators
Progress indicators Status quo Industry Industry BAU Gap
forecast forecast Scenario
scenario scenario 2030
2020 2030
Purchase price [€1000s] 113 29 25 31 24%
FC stack costs [€/kw] 367 98 44 125 182%
Battery costs [€/kwh] 871 300 260 260 0%
H2 tank costs [€/kg] 775 270 300 11%
Source: Bruegel/ESMT.
2.1.4 Production infrastructure: hydrogen production cost
Although the hydrogen distribution infrastructure is still in its infancy, a hydrogen
production infrastructure alreadyexists. Thus, an extension of existing capacities could
be utilised to provide hydrogen in the initial phase of the FCEV deployment.
Current situation and consensus forecast for hydrogen costs development
Hydrogen production costs depend on the mix of production technologies employed
(see Table 5). While currently mostly a side product of other processes, some cost
reduction can be achieved when hydrogen is produced on an industrial scale. Falling
equipment costs of decentralised production facilities will also add to the cost
reduction potential. However, the cost decline from increasing the output of con-
ventional production methods may be partly oﬀset by increased costs as production
moves towards sustainable and decentralised production methods. Indeed, there
seems to be a targets conﬂict between reducing the carbon emissions of hydrogen
production and achieving low production costs.
Table 5: Production cost for selected production methods
Coal Coal Gas Biofuel
steaming CCS reforming reforming Electrolysis
Costs [EUR/GJ] 4.4-7.5 4.9-14.3 5.6-21.8 10.4-21.2 11.4-22.7
GHG emissions [kg/GJ] 193 8.8 73-87 0 n/a
Source: Blesl et al (2009).
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25. The learning-by-doing cost regression coeﬃcient expresses the cost decline that can be achieved with each
doubling of cumulated production experience.
A review of the literature, and the forecasts made therein, suggests that hydrogen
production costs have little cost reduction potential. Production costs (excluding any
tax and excise duty) are currently around €5/kg. Only marginal declines are expected
by 2020 and most observers are expecting a ﬂoor of around €3-4/kg in the long term
(Table 6).
Table 6: Hydrogen production cost development (excluding taxes, fuel excise duty),
€/kg
Row Labels 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
HyWays (2008) n/a 4.0 3.0
The Connecticut Center for n/a 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8
Advanced Technology Inc. (2011)
McKinsey & Company (2010)* 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.8
Source: Roads2HyCom (2009), McKinsey & Company (2010), The Connecticut Center for Advanced Technology, Inc.
(2011). Note: * excluding transport and retail margin.
To simulate the interdependence between consumer choice, market uptake and
hydrogen fuel costs, we again use a two-factor-learning-curve approach (described in
Box 8). Unlike the fuel cell vehicle component costs, however, the level of hydrogen
fuel cost reduction achieved via learning-by-doing is expected to be considerably
lower. This is partly due to the fact that production methods used for hydrogen are
already well established. With decades of experience with some of the methods of
current production, costs are likely to be on a much lower point of the learning curve.
McKinsey & Company (2010) suggests a learning rate between 3-7 percent, which is
signiﬁcantly lower than the 15 percent stakeholders expect to see for fuel cell
production25.
In conclusion, current hydrogen production costs are already relatively close to the
target values stated in the literature and by stakeholders. The challenge ahead lies
in increasing the share of low emission production methods while keeping
production costs low.
2.1.5 Retail distribution infrastructure: network density
With little indication of a policy gap with respect to the actual production costs,
attention moves towards providing an adequate retail infrastructure for FCEVs –
speciﬁcally, the trade-oﬀ between low hydrogen fuel retail prices and the proﬁtability
of fuel stations. Indeed, the main driver of hydrogen fuel costs may not actually be
production costs but ensuring a retail margin which provides enough incentive for an
adequate hydrogen fuel station network in the early commercialisation but which does
not deter consumers.
Similar to conventional vehicles, FCEVs require a dedicated reﬁlling infrastructure.
Suﬃcient network density is a pivotal factor for the successful market adoption of
hydrogen vehicles. As such, a suﬃcient minimum infrastructure will have to be
provided in parallel to the commercial launch of FCEVs. However, with the number of
users likely to be low in the early stages of market deployment, the proﬁtable provision
of infrastructure is unlikely. Central to the analysis are two questions: how much
infrastructure is required to provide suﬃcient consumer acceptance, and how much
of this infrastructure will be provided autonomously by the market?
Infrastructure demand: how much infrastructure is needed?
A lack of infrastructure reduces the utility of vehicles as users are faced with
uncertainty, search costs, and the need to calculate detours in order to refuel their
cars. Consequently, car buyers value dense networks of refuelling stations and would
choose a propulsion technology with a high network density over an alternative with
low density, ceteris paribus. However, determining the actual utility of refuelling
stations is less conclusive. Often, the existence of refuelling stations for emerging
alternative vehicles is measured by calculating the network density – the share of the
existing refuelling network oﬀering the alternative fuel.
In Achtnicht et al (2008), and Ziegler (2009), the marginal utility of refuelling is a
constant and their models exhibit a very strong eﬀect from these variables. The
calculated willingness to pay ranges from €200-300 for each percent network density.
However, a limitation of these results is that they rely on a constant marginal
willingness to pay, while it is more than likely that the marginal utility of refuelling
stations will be decreasing. This shortcoming is addressed in an approach by Greene
(2001), where the utility of refuelling stations can be represented as an exponential
function.
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Figure 5: Estimated willingness to pay for network density, € per vehicle
Source: ESMT (2011).
There is a trade-oﬀ between the cost of providing suﬃcient infrastructure and the
increase in willingness to pay for a higher network density. The willingness-to-pay
estimates of the various stated preference surveys indicate that a network density of
above 10 percent is enough to reduce disutility of low network density to a suﬃcient
level. McKinsey & Company (2010) argue for a density of around one percent in 2020
to increase to one of around nine percent in 203026, and to one of about twenty percent
by 2050 (see Table 7).
Table 7: Literature review infrastructure demand, reﬁlling stations (thousands)
Source 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050
HyWays (2008) 0.9 10.0 20.0
Industry forecast 0.8 2.3 5.1 18.2
Source: McKinsey & Company (2010), Roads2HyCom (2009).
Infrastructure supply: how much infrastructure will be provided by the market?
Currently, the number of refuelling stations available in Europe is limited to a low
number of demonstration sites. This reﬂects the pre-commercialisation phase of the
26. Estimate based on around 60,000 conventional refuelling stations in Europe.
technology. Taken together, the number of stations does not exceed 100 – this
compares to an estimated 60,000 conventional fuel stations across Europe. In
Germany, a consortium of industry representatives has recently agreed to double the
number refuelling stations to around 60-80 stations by the end of 2015.
Looking at supply, the number of refuelling stations provided by the market is strongly
determined by the size of the hydrogen vehicle ﬂeet. Consumer acceptance of the
technology is, in turn, inﬂuenced by the existence of adequate network density. This
negative feedback loop can lead to an under-provision of infrastructure in the market,
especially if future demand is uncertain. To model this interdependency, a simple
break-even modelling approach was used. The break-even model estimates the
number of charging stations that can be proﬁtably operated for a given number of
FCEVs in the vehicle stock, the current equipment costs, and the retail margins of
hydrogen refuelling stations.
Table 8: Assumption hydrogen stations break-even analysis
Assumption Value Source
Equipment costs €1 million (2012) - 0.5 million (2050) Weinert et al (2007)
Capital costs (WACC) 7% p.a. McKinsey & Company (2010)
Operating costs 10% of equipment costs p.a. Weinert et al (2007)
Retail margin 15% of H2 retail delivered price Own assumption
Asset life time 20 year McKinsey & Company (2010)
Fuel station capacity 500 kg/day Own assumption
Unsurprisingly, using these assumptions indicates that in the BAU scenario, the
number of charging stations proﬁtably provided by the market will remain signiﬁcantly
below the consensus target. This reﬂects the aforementioned negative feedback loop
between a sluggish up-take and hence low demand for hydrogen fuel, and low
willingness to pay for hydrogen cars due to the lack of infrastructure (see Table 7).
However, even a scenario where the market penetration targets are met may see an
insuﬃcient number of fuel stations provided in the short and medium term.
Clearly, such a straightforward break-even analysis suﬀers from a number of short-
comings. For example, it neglects investor expectations regarding the future
development of demand. Investors may tolerate losses in the early commercialisation
phase hoping that these would be compensated as soon as the market for FCEVs
evolves. This notion supports the view that transparent policy objectives and clear
commitments can go a long way in providing certainty for long-term investments in
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hydrogen fuel stations. In fact, this self-fulﬁlling prophecy can work in both directions
– supporting market uptake if investors are positive about the prospects of FCEVs, but
inhibiting market uptake, and hence infrastructure demand, when expectations are
low or uncertain (or both). Consequently, it is our view that the business as usual
scenario is a conservative, but not unrealistic, scenario reﬂecting a negative feedback
loop between sluggish demand and lack of infrastructure.
Figure 6: Number of hydrogen stations BAU vs. industry forecast scenario
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
Unlikesomeotheremergingpropulsion technologies,hydrogenvehicles requirededicated
refuelling infrastructure. Inorder togaincompetiveness,10-20percentofexistingstations
need to be equipped with hydrogen refuelling facilities. Considering the proﬁtability of
such infrastructure, there isastrong likelihood that themarketwill notprovideanadequate
number of hydrogen refuelling stations in the short and medium term. This could lead to
a negative feedback loop between FCEV demand and fuel station provision, resulting in
the technology missing the deployment targets envisioned by the industry.
In addition to adequate production and retail infrastructure, a mass-market rollout of
hydrogen vehicles would require a suitable and cost-eﬀective transmission infra-
structure to link retail and production sites. Unlike other infrastructure components,
there are currently already several viable transport options available. Indeed, pipeline
transport of hydrogen has been used for more than 50 years. Existing pipeline
networks for industrial use in Belgium andNorthern France (more than 1000 km) could
form the basis for future network extensions (Blesl et al, 2009).
Truck and trailer-based transport provides a ﬂexible and economically viable option
for transporting hydrogen. For example, compressed gas-tube trailer trucks could be
used – especially for distances under 200km, and in regions where low demand would
not justify a dedicated pipeline infrastructure. However, the actual mix of transport
techniques would depend on the prevailing production mix (centralised versus
decentralised production), and the trajectory of demand (Roads2HyCom, 2009).
In conclusion, providing suitable hydrogen infrastructure is likely to be one of the key
factors for a successful roll-out of hydrogen vehicles. This requires the development
of adequate and cost-eﬀective production capacity with a hydrogen production cost
target of around €4/kg in the medium term. The challenge here seems to be increasing
the share of low emission production techniques while keeping production costs at
an aﬀordable level. This would require both a suﬃcient scale of demand and
investment in R&D, to reduce production costs for new decentralised facilities.
Another prerequisite for a mass market launch is the existence of a basic retail
infrastructure (roughly 10percent network density). There is indication that, especially
in the early stages of market development, suﬃcient density cannot be provided
proﬁtably. Suﬃcient density might only be provided with high retail fuel costs as low
utility rates would lead to excessive retail margins. Table 9 summarises the main
infrastructure and fuel success factors with their indicators.
Table 9: Infrastructure and fuel factors and relevant indicators
Progress indicators Status Industry Industry BAU Gap
quo forecast forecast Scenario
scenario scenario 2030
2020 2030
Number of refuelling stations 0 5.4 12.55 0.6 -95%
[thousand units]
Network density [Share of 0 9 21 1 -95%
existing fuel stations]
H2 production costs [€/kg] 5.0 4.5 3.6 4 12%
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
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2.2 Consumer acceptance and the technological and commercial gap
Only the combination of suitable infrastructure with a competitive propulsion
technology will make FCEV a success. Based on the factors identiﬁed above, we ask
how certain outcomes of those indicators will aﬀect acceptance among consumers.
Consumer acceptance will be measured by estimating the willingness-to-pay
diﬀerence to established technologies, and the actual market share of new
registrations which can be expected. The results are derived using the Market Model
Electric Mobility (MMEM). Initially, we will model the outcomes of the industry forecast
scenario and the BAU scenario described previously. Hence, we can compare how
consumer acceptance develops in aworldwhere all targets andmilestones aremet (as
assumed in the industry forecast scenario) to how it would develop endogenously if
no market intervention were to take place.
2.2.1 Consumer acceptance of FCEVs
The core assumption of the industry forecast scenario is that all key factors identiﬁed
will meet their targets and milestones (see section 2.1.1). In this case, the a-priori
expectation would be to see FCEVs gaining competitiveness in the medium term and
becoming a comparable technology option in the long run. To investigate how
competitiveness develops when the targets are reached, we estimate the willingness-
to-pay gap compared to a conventional diesel engine. The willingness-to-pay gap
expresses how much more or less a consumer is willing to pay for vehicles compared
to a typical diesel car. As Figure 7 shows, if the targets are met, FCEVs can quickly gain
in competitiveness. However, even based on this optimistic scenario, hydrogen
vehicles will only be perceived as an equal option after 2040.
This is also reﬂected in the actual market share forecast for the diﬀerent technologies
shown in Figure 8 (the orange shaded area shows the market share development of
hydrogen vehicles). Following their commercial launch in 2015, it will take until the
mid-2030s for the technology to gain a signiﬁcant market share. Further ahead, we
would expect a market share of around 25 percent in 2050 if the factor targets are met.
Thus, the modelling results of Figure 8 are in line with the prediction of McKinsey &
Company (2010) that FCEV can achieve a market share of about 25 percent if the
industry forecasts on all key factors materialise. Clearly, given the time horizon of the
forecast, and the uncertainty regarding the development of the inputs, there is a
considerable margin of error associated with the forecasts. However, this and the
following forecast can still deliver valuable insights regarding the trends and shifts in
diﬀerent scenarios.
Figure 7: Willingness to pay gap 2012-2020, €/vehicle diﬀerence to diesel engine,
industry forecast scenario
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
Figure 8: Market share forecasts 2012-2050, industry forecast scenario
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
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2.2.2 FCEV market penetration under selected scenarios
The industry forecast scenario described previously is based on the rather optimistic
assumption that the objectives formulated in the previous sections are met. If these
are not met, the market potential of FCEVs is likely to be severely constrained. High
purchase prices, fuel costs and the lack of infrastructure would mean that hydrogen-
powered vehicles would remain a niche technology. Indeed, a negative feedback loop
between slow market uptake, missing learning-by-doing cost reductions and, hence,
high fuel and purchase costs and low consumer acceptance, would cause a far lower
market penetration trajectory when compared with the Industry forecast scenario (see
Figure 9).
Figure 9: Market penetration of FCEVs BAU vs. industry forecast scenario
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
To put the ﬁndings into perspective, the BAU scenario in Figure 9 includes some strict
assumptions. The BAU assumes a complete absence of autonomous research and
development investment as well as no change in mobility and energy taxation policies,
reﬂecting the policy status of 2011. However, while conservative, it is our view that
the business as usual case describes a realistic scenario. Indeed, our analysis
indicates that a concerted eﬀort will be required for hydrogen vehicles to achieve
competitiveness. If that is not the case, a negative feedback loop and mutual
ampliﬁcation between the key factors leads to the technology remaining a niche
product. Additionally, the nature, scope and timing of measures taken can have a
signiﬁcant impact on the market adoption trajectory of the technology.
Finally, this raises the question of how some of the shortcomings which lead to the
outcome of the BAU scenario can be addressed. To illustrate the impacts of some
measures, a number of selected scenarios will be discussed here:
• Scenario 1: An increase in R&D to achieve an early reduction in production costs of
both fuel and vehicles;
• Scenario 2: Infrastructure build-up to increase infrastructure deployment to the
level of industry forecast;
• Scenario 3: Carbon pricing – inclusion of the car industry in the EU Emissions
Trading System, which would see manufacturers having to obtain emission
certiﬁcates for the estimated life time emissions of each vehicle sold. This would
increase the purchase costs of high-emitting technologies and improve the
competiveness of low-emission technologies such as FCEVs27.
• Scenario 4: The scenario that all measures described above will be employed
together.
Figure 10 shows the results of the simulation exercises. Applied without any other
measures, R&D funding is the only instrument likely to increase market uptake
signiﬁcantly. An infrastructure investment on its own, while the vehicles are still
uncompetitive in terms of purchase prices, would not lead to any signiﬁcant increase
in the future market share. Similarly, an inclusion of the car industry in the Emissions
Trading System (ETS) would not suﬃce to improve competitiveness of FCEVs enough
to overcome the remaining shortcomings.
These initial simulation results suggest that a comprehensive package of measures is
needed to close the gap between hydrogen and other established or emerging
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27. Speciﬁcally, we have assumed that car manufacturers need to buy certiﬁcates for the life time emissions of each
vehicle produced. We assume an ETS price of €15/tonne CO2 increasing to €80/tonne CO2 by 2050. Assuming life
time emissions of around 20 tonnes CO2 per vehicle this would mean a penalty of €300-€1600 per vehicle. While
this has a signiﬁcant impact in long run, the incentive is eﬀective too late to assist market uptake for FCEVs in the
early commercialisation phase.
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propulsion technologies. Indeed, the results indicate that only a concerted approach
is likely to lead to any signiﬁcant increase in the market share of FCEVs in the
foreseeable future. Employing a package that would combine infrastructure support,
R&D funding, and ETS inclusion is likely to lead to a market share approaching 14
percent in 2050 (scenario 4, blue line). While this is still below the industry forecast
scenario of 25 percent in 2050 (orange line), it would serve to establish FCEVs as a
mass market technology in the foreseeable future.
Figure 11 indicates that the stronger deployment of hydrogen cars in the industry
forecast scenario, as compared to the concerted approach, crowds out some of the
growth in the share of cars with Range Extender (RE) and Plug-in Hybrid Electric
Vehicles (PHEV).
Figure 10: Simulation results, FCEV market share
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010).
Figure 11: Market share forecasts 2012-2050, concerted approach
Source: Bruegel/ESMT based on ESMT (2011).
2.3 Current policies
The EU, all itsmember states andmany sub-national entities have devised instruments
to support new energy and transport technologies. Some of these instruments
explicitly or implicitly target fuel cell electric vehicles. Currently, most of the identiﬁed
market failures are partially addressed (see also the policy table in the appendix).
2.3.1 Climate externality
Due to the absence of an international climate agreement beyond 2013, there is
currently no global long-term carbon price signal. Fuel taxes for fossil fuels and, in
some countries, road tolls are partially internalising some of the negative externalities
of road transport emissions. However, these taxes/tolls are supposed to correct many
externalities at the same time: local pollution, noise emissions, congestion, import
dependency, land consumption, road construction and other road traﬃc-related cost.
As the number of externalities being addressed is large it is likely that taxes/tolls under-
compensate in correcting the climate externality.
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In contrast to conventional fuels, hydrogen and electricity currently do not pay fuel
taxes in most member states. However, electricity consumption (eg for the production
of hydrogen from electrolysis) is taxed in many countries and subject to the EU ETS.
Furthermore, some forms of hydrogenproduction are subject to the ETS. Consequently,
an inconsistent situation exists. While, the fuels of FCEVs and battery electric vehicles
are largely subject to the EU ETS, fossil fuels are not covered. Thus, if the share of FCEVs
and battery electric vehicles were to increase dramatically, on the one hand their fuels
might becomesigniﬁcantlymore expensive as theywould absorbmore of the valuable
emission rights and thereby increase their price. On the other hand, the prices of fossil
fuels would be unaﬀected (or even decrease due to lower demand), creating a rebound
eﬀect.
For the purpose of including emissions cost, the Commission proposes a minimum
harmonisation (proposal for directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC, published on
13 April 2011). The key idea behind this tax is to increase the retail price of fuels used
in transport and heating to a level that makes them competitive with alternative ones.
Currently, it is suggested that the minimum tax rate be split into two parts:
• Carbon component => €20 per ton of CO2
• Energy content component => €9.6 per gigajoule for motor fuel and €0.15 per
gigajoule for heating fuels
For incentivising car manufacturers to conduct long-term investments in low-carbon
vehicles, the EU has devised a vehicle ﬂeet emission standard28. Based on this
standard, each manufacturer has to ensure that the average emissions per kilometre
of all cars he sells in Europe are below a certain threshold. Currently, EU Regulation
(EC) No 443/200929 sets a target value of 130 grammes CO2 per kilometre [g CO2/km]
by 2015 and of 95 g CO2/km by 2020 for new passenger cars. The target is gradually
phased in: in 2012, 65 percent of each manufacturer’s newly registered cars must
comply, rising to 75 percent in 2013, 80 percent in 2014, and to reach 100 percent by
2015. These vehicle ﬂeet emission standards provide incentives for investment and
R&D in the absence of a long-term carbon price.
28. The scheme is comparable to the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) programme. The US programme
requires cars sold in the US to meet a minimum fuel economy (miles per gallon of fuel) standard. The penalty for
not meeting this standard is $5.50 per tenth of a mile per gallon for each tenth under the target value times the total
volume of those vehicles manufactured for a given model year.
29. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0001:0015:EN:PDF.
Public support gap
The transport sector is responsible for almost 20 percent of the EU emissions. This
share will rise to 30 percent by 2050 due to lower reduction targets compared to other
sectors. Still, the fossil fuels for transport are not included in the EU ETS. Consequently,
there is no dedicated instrument to incentivise consumers to adapt their day-by-day
driving decisions to the need for emission reductions. As alternative fuels such as
hydrogen and electricity fall under the ETS, these technologies are put at a dis-
advantage with respect to conventional fuels. Consequently, a consistent approach
towards including the transport sector in an economy-wide emission reduction is
missing.
2.3.2 Innovation externality
Individual ﬁrms under-invest in R&D because they do not fully internalise the social
beneﬁts of R&D investments. Patent protection, public R&Daswell as ﬁnancial support
to private R&D are the most prominent tools to resolve the innovation externality.While
patent legislation is essentially a horizontal exercise, support to R&D needs to be
targeted. The question of technological choice becomes a pressing one as alternative
technologies begin to mature. Path-dependencies that might have the force to lock in
suboptimal technologies that experience an early advantage– eg above-proportionate
public support – make the issue of technology choice for public funding even more
pressing. At some point in the realisation of an energy transition, government must
make a choice over competing technologies. Public budgets are limited and, thus,
equal ﬁnancial support to overcome market failures for all technologies might lead to
underfunding for all alternatives. In the worst case, all clean technologies then fail to
become competitive. With a constrained budget, supporting some promising
technologies at the right level might be superior to complete technology-neutrality
and underfunding to all technologies. Furthermore, attributes of an energy system,
such as infrastructure or standards, are, by nature, technology-speciﬁc. Consequently,
the public sector has to decidewhich, when, andhow to support diﬀerent technologies.
How are technologies selected for support?
Support schemes for encouraging R&D exist at the regional, member state and EU
level. Member states do not currently coordinate with each other in developing their
support mechanisms.
EU level support for new technologies is focused on support for R&D. Strategic plans
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are developed and outlined via packages (such as the Strategic Energy Technology
Plan, or SET plan). Packages do not allocate funding nor do they possess funds to be
granted. For example, the Green Cars Initiative is fundedbymoney from the EUSeventh
Framework Programme and loans from the European Investment Bank. Packages are
strategic documents outlining priorities. Priorities in eight diﬀerent energy technology
areas are currently determined by long consensus-building process between the EU,
industry, and academics. European technology platforms30, consisting of industry
stakeholders, the EU and academic work to determine funding. Consensus-building is
a major exercise, which has the latitude for short-term changes to address needs. For
deployment, the EU currently provides no money – the money comes from member
states, regions, and industry. Packages are long multiannual programs for funding with
year-to-year disbursement. There are mid-term assessments for the whole framework
and for the diﬀerent parts. The assessments are conducted by experts groups from
the respective ﬁelds, though they are led and facilitated by the European Commission’s
Directorate General for Energy.
Part of the SET plan established consortia (bringing together industry, the research
community, and the Commission in public-private partnerships). The establishment of
the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU) was accomplished via this
regulation. These formalised structures are created by council regulation to help ensure
long-termprogrammestability through the oscillations of technologyhype. The funding
for FCH JU projects comes from both the public (via the EU Framework Programmes)
and private sources. The scheme calls for 50-50 cost-sharing and facilitates
coordination amongst stakeholders and conﬁdence among public and private
investors. Currently, the FCH JU has a nearly €1 billion budget, jointly contributed by
members.
At the member state level, one highly developed support scheme, to encourage R&D
investment, is that of the German government. The German National Organisation for
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology (NOW) programme is wholly government-owned,
but encourages partnership with industry via co-ﬁnancing of fuel-cell related projects.
It has €1.4 billion in total budget for the period 2007-16. Half of this comes from the
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, and the Federal Ministry of Transport,
Building and Urban Aﬀairs; and half comes from industry.
Regional support for hydrogen and fuel cells also exists. For example, the Flemish
government fundsR&Dvia the IWT-Vlaanderen and the FWO-Vlaanderen. These channel
30. The technology platforms are formalised into six European Industrial Initiatives (EII) and one Joint Technology
Initiative (JTI).
public R&D funds to both industries and universities. The regional support takes a
bottom-up approach, although some participation in larger programmes also takes
place.
Support programmes in Europe to encourage innovation entail either direct ﬁnancial
support or consortia-arranged ﬁnancial support approach. Other types of public
instruments have been employed elsewhere, for encouraging innovation and R&D. For
example, the Japanese Top Runner Programme sets energy-eﬃciency standards on a
periodic basis and does not incur a large public cost. It selects a ‘top-runner’ standard
which companies must meet. This is not yet in place for new technologies such as
hydrogen and fuel cells but may be an interesting policy consideration for the future
(Box 9).
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BOX 9: JAPAN TOP RUNNER PROGRAMME
The Top Runner Programme is aimed at increasing energy eﬃciency via the
establishment of standards. The programme is iterative, and covers a wide variety
of products, including gasoline, diesel, and LPG passenger vehicles. Regulators
iteratively test the available products in the market for use-phase energy eﬃciency,
and set as the new standard the energy-eﬃciency of the ‘top-runner’ product.
Energy-eﬃciency standards also take technical potential into consideration and
compliance is evaluated by the corporate average.
The programme itself goes through multiple revisions, addressing the scope of
covered products (eg phase-out of cathode-ray tube television sets). It avoids the
implications of its stringent standards on trade as most products covered are largely
supplied by the internal market. Standards and target dates are set collaboratively
with industry. The programme does not stipulate the ‘how’ and regulators take no
oﬃcial action until the target years are reached. The programme is strictly supplier-
oriented – relating to technical performance and not aggregate energy impact.
In the transport sector, the Top Runner Programme relates to fuel-eﬃciency (similar
to the US CAFE programme or the EU vehicle ﬂeet emission standards). Ideal fuel
eﬃciency has been improved due to the fuel eﬃciency improvement of new cars.
Real running fuel eﬃciency has also been improved since the introduction of Top
Runner. There was a 22.8 percent improvement in fuel eﬃciency for gasoline
passenger vehicles from 1995-2005, and a 21.7 percent improvement in diesel
freight vehicle fuel eﬃciency.
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Evaluation (Nordqvist, 2006):
• Few revisions have been carried out and, as such, there is a lack of quantitative
data. There is little information regarding the energy impact of this programme, or
the cost, due to the lack of data. Costs of the programme may have been passed
by manufacturers onto consumers, although consumers may be expected to
recoup the costs through savings in energy. Its cost to public funds is low.
• There is a danger (due to evidenced over-compliance) that standards set may
already be achievable with products not on the market. Therefore, this policy may
not actually be spurring technological innovations. In addition, care needs to be
taken in deﬁning product categories such that the standards do not stiﬂe
competition.
Policy implications:
• Adoption in Europe would require alterations to the Japanese Top Runner
Programme: to account for imports, sanctions, diﬀerent national standards
already in place, and parallel policies.
• Historically, there has been a close cooperation between Japanese government
and industry, and this may not be true in Europe.
• The advantage of this type of policy is that it is not technology-speciﬁc and adopts
a collaborative approach to motivate technological advancement.
• The potential pitfall of the collaborative approach and the use of benchmarking
may be a lack of incentive to set high enough benchmarks or a lack of incentive
to be the top-runner (eg when the market is small, it may be easier for a ﬁrm to
wait before releasing technology to the market which meets a new standard).
• Consumer awareness may play a role as energy eﬃciency rankings and
information are provided to customers.
Public support gap
The EU and its member states have an established system of supporting research and
development. It has, however, been argued that the EU has missed its Lisbon strategy
target for R&D investments relative to GDP. In particular, as demonstrated in Table 10,
it lags behind the US and Japan in terms of green innovation (Veugelers, 2011).
Table 10: Green innovation
Size Specialisation Concentration
Share of country in world RTA in clean- Herfindahl across clean-
clean- energy tech patents energy tech patents energy tech technologies
Top six
Japan 0.297 0.99 0.72
US 0.159 0.87 0.33
Germany 0.152 1.05 0.28
Korea 0.056 1.21 0.82
France 0.039 0.7 0.26
UK 0.036 0.98 0.28
EU 0.32 1.01 0.25
BRICs
China 0.009 1.11 0.36
India 0.003 1.44 0.45
Russia 0.002 1.11 0.27
Brazil 0.002 1.51 0.41
Source: Veugelers (2011)31.
Thus, more incentives for innovation and more targeted incentives for ‘green’
innovation are essential.
How can the current technology choice methodology be improved?
Although the current method for determining technology choice is iterative,
consensus-building, and focused on the long-term, support is fragmented between
technologies. There is no consensus-building amongst regions, member states and
the EU. International coordination is also currently lacking. As the process is
fragmented and decentralised, there is currently no overall portfolio or technology
view. Additionally, support for individual technologies is determined largely on
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31. Source: Bruegel based on UNEP/EPO/ICTSD (2010). Note: Patents are counted on the basis of claimed priorities
(patent applications ﬁled in other countries based on the ﬁrst ﬁled patent for a particular invention). A Top 6 country
has at least two percent of world clean-energy technology patents; together the Top 6 represent 74 percent of
world clean-energy technology patents. RTA = share of the country in world clean-energy technology patents
relative to the share of the country in total world patents; RTA > 1 measures specialisation in clean-energy
technology patents; Herﬁndahl is the weighted sum of the share of each clean-energy technology in total country’s
clean-energy technology patents, with the weights being the share. The Herﬁndahl ratio varies between 0 (maximal
dispersion) and 1 (perfect concentration).
performance promises by industry and advice from industry-experts. The incentives
for industry to provide over-optimistic information are great as, by providing over-
optimistic projections, industry may obtain additional funds and delay losses on their
investments. Although JTIs are important for avoiding oscillations in enthusiasm for
diﬀerent technologies (fads), they may also create some institutional inertia32.
Although initiatives andpackages are subject tomid-term reviews, these are performed
by industry experts. Expert industry-speciﬁc knowledge is required for proper
assessment of technology progress, but experts may also be biased toward
technologies in their ﬁeld. For example, scientists working with nuclear may generally
be in favour of nuclear.
Most importantly, there is not enough transparency as regards to the technology-
choice mechanism. The European Commission has published a transport white paper
as a roadmap to a single European transportation area. Although it includes modelling
of diﬀerent scenarios, it does not include a transparent technological choice
methodology. A fuel-speciﬁc strategy document, the Future Transport Fuels Report,
was published with a comprehensive alternative fuel strategy. This report contains the
current state of aﬀairs, and potential, for the diﬀerent alternative fuels, and outlines an
alternative fuel strategy. A similar report on infrastructure build-up is due out in 2012.
These reports address EU policy and clean transport system strategies and goals but
a more transparent methodology for choosing the portfolio is still missing.
2.3.3 Infrastructure externality
A major obstacle for the deployment of vehicles propelled by alternative fuels is the
absence of a corresponding refuelling/recharging infrastructure. For example, ﬁnal
consumers will only accept FCEVs if a suﬃciently dense network of hydrogen fuelling
stations exists. The value proposition of FCEVs (as compared to battery electric
vehicles) is to replace conventional cars in terms of range implies that all European
destinations within reach of a fossil fuelled car should essentially be accessible by
FCEVs as well. Thus hydrogen fuel stations will at some point have to cover the entire
European market. Figure 12 summarises the number of existing hydrogen refuelling
stations, in European countries. This provides clear evidence that refuelling infra-
structure in Europe is developing at very diﬀerent speed.
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32. See section 1.2.3 for further information regarding institutional path dependency.
Figure 12: Number of refuelling stations in EU-27 plus Switzerland, Norway and
Turkey
Source: http://www.h2stations.org/
As the deployment of hydrogen fuelling stations is not yet commercial due to the
absence of FCEVs, the majority of existing stations is based on bottom-up initiatives
from diﬀerent demonstration projects. Those are concentrated in particular countries,
regions or even cities. There are four primary approaches observed in Europe for
solving the problem of FCEV refuelling infrastructure deployment.
1. Deﬁning the need: the HyWays project concentrated on analysing the problem of
optimal roll-out of hydrogen fuelling stations inmetropolitan areas based on census
and traﬃc density data. The results indicate that 13,000-20,000 refuelling stations
would be required in Europe by 2025 to supply up to 10 million vehicles
(NextHyLights, 2010).
2. National coordination: H2 Mobility (Germany) provides good example of a national
coordination programme involving industry and the public sector. The programme
was initiated by Daimler and Linde, assembling a group of companies for
addressing the infrastructure issue in terms of developing uniﬁed fuel station
standards, costs and risks sharing between private and public sectors and
appropriate policy support instruments.
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3. Cross-border coordination: the Scandinavian Hydrogen Highway Partnership
initiative constitutes a transnational networking platform that catalyses and
coordinates collaboration between three national networking bodies – HyNor
(Norway), Hydrogen Link (Denmark), andHydrogenSweden (Sweden)– andbased
on regional clusters that involve major and small industries, research institutions,
and local/regional authorities.
4. Large-scale demonstration projects in pilot regions (cities): currently Germany
has shown the strongest progress in unfolding large scale demonstration projects.
The ‘Clean Energy Partnership’ is the largest hydrogen demonstration project in
Europe. Moreover, through the National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology
Innovation Programme (NIP) Germany has developed the most ambitious FCEV
programme with a total budget of €1.4 billion, even surpassing the European
programme for that purpose.
Infrastructure initiatives in the US and Japan may serve to inform the European model.
The US model is noteworthy for its scheme driving the supply-side investment in and
development of Zero Emission Vehicles (Box 10). Additionally, the example of the
Japanese demonstration programme provides possible methods to encourage greater
involvement of industry in the demonstration and testing phases (Box 11). Germany
has already coordinated with the Japanese FCEV programmes in order to share
experiences. However, further international coordination in infrastructure development
and standardisation should be undertaken (for example, at the EU level).
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BOX 10: CALIFORNIA CLEAN CARS CAMPAIGN
The California Clean Cars Campaign promotes low-emissions vehicles through the
Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) programme and the Clean Fuels Outlet (CFO) regulation.
Both were established in 1990.
The Zero Emission Vehicle standard applies to passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and
medium-duty vehicles which produce zero exhaust emissions of a criteria pollutant.
The ZEV regulation requires that a manufacturer maintain a certain percentage of
ZEV certiﬁed vehicles in the vehicles delivered for sale in California. For 2012-14 this
is 12 percent and 15 percent for 2015-17 Zero and Partial Zero Emission Vehicles.
The pure ZEV requirements were 2.5 percent for 2009-11, 3 percent for 2012-14,
and 4 percent for 2015-17. Only large-volume manufacturers are subject to the ZEV
requirements, while intermediate-volume manufacturers can meet requirements
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with PZEV (ICCT Review, March 2011; and ZEV Regulation as of December, 2009).
This regulation has contributed to the over 750,000 Californians driving partial zero-
emission vehicles.
The Clean Fuels Outlet regulation exists to help ensure that there would be suﬃcient
infrastructure for the refuelling of zero emission vehicles. It is seen as a backstop in
case other approaches fail to result in suﬃcient infrastructure. It is currently
triggered at 20,000 vehicles of a particular type of clean fuel in California.
Noncompliance results in ﬁnes – if owners of outlets fail to equip the required
number, they are ﬁned $500/car for the ﬁrst 10 cars fuelled with gasoline each day
of the violation; if the owners fail to provide clean fuels at a speciﬁc outlet, or fails to
meet supply and amenity requirements, the ﬁne is $500/car for the ﬁrst 5 cars
fuelled with gasoline daily. Currently, this legislation is applicable to all alternative
fuels certiﬁed to Low Emission Vehicle Standard. There is discussion about limiting
to ZEV fuels only and to focus on GHG reductions.
Evaluation (ICCT Review, March 2011; and NDRC Report, May 2010):
• Currently there are discussions around (i) moving from the zero emission vehicle
standard to a ﬂeet average GHG requirement (like the federal or the European
approach) and (ii) taking into account and standardising the upstream GHG
emission calculations.
• Reliable estimates of the implicit economic cost of the CFO and the ZEV are not
available.
Policy implications:
• The Zero Emission Vehicle programme provides a framework for ensuring a
minimum number of zero emission vehicles.
• The Clean Fuel Outlet programme is a regulatory approach to solve the
infrastructure externality in a technology neutral way. A ﬁnal evaluation of this
programme would require to understand (i) whether the trigger value for the
number of cars prevents a solution to the chicken-and-egg problem and (ii) what
the economic cost of this programme are.
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BOX 11: JAPANESE HYDROGEN AND FUEL CELL DEMONSTRATION PROJECT (JHFC)
The JHFC includes two projects: the ‘Fuel Cell Vehicle Demonstration Study’ and the
‘Hydrogen Infrastructures Demonstration Study’. This research was subsidised by
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The project had a larger budget than the
US Freedom Car programmes and the US Hydrogen Fuel Initiative combined.
Fleet testing was conducted by third-parties – including Mercedes-Benz Japan,
Nissan, Honda and Toyota. Demonstration data were used by the Japanese
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Demonstration Project to conduct environmental impact
studies. Furthermore the project analysed technology and policy trends, and
developed public relations and education strategies.
Comparison with other demonstration projects:
• The JHFC is the ﬁrst national project to obtain driving data systematically via
demonstration testing;
• CaFCPwas the world’s ﬁrst driving test on public roads for data and promote public
awareness;
• The Japanese project had the largest budget per year, followed closely by Europe
and then the US. However, the test budget and vehicle subsidies were less than
the US, greater than Europe. Data collection was largest in the US but limited in
both Japan and Europe;
• JHFC saw the largest participation of global automakers and Japanese
infrastructure companies. In the US it was mostly US automakers and no
Japanese automakers. In Europe it was mostly European automakers and this
had the fewest participants. Several key energy companies also participated in
JHFC and helped to promote communication between automakers and energy
companies.
Lessons learned:
• Perhaps a consortium approach is useful – JHFC was able to involve many global
players. The transition will need to be a global one to increase proﬁtability.
• The number of fuelling stations and registered FCEVs in Japan is comparable to the
US and Europe. As Japan as a region covers a smaller geographic area, their
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Public support gap
Currently, the national and European initiatives for early-market deployment of
hydrogen fuelling stations are not coordinated in terms of timeframe, stakeholders,
areas to be covered, standards, and roll-out plan. EU level (HyWays), regional
(Scandinavian Hydrogen Highway Partnership) and member state initiatives (eg
Germany, Denmark) are too small in scope to give clear signals for a regional, let alone
European, infrastructure expansion. The idiosyncratic projects lack a general
framework. Thus, a comparative evaluation is not possible.
2.3.4 Other market failures addressed by current policies
Other externalities introduced in the ﬁrst chapter are also partially addressed by
current public policies. These include pollution and noise, import dependency, the
coordination externality, business exploration externality, industrial policy externality,
and the insurance externality. Policies currently in place typically do not target these
externalities separately. Therefore, we address these jointly in this section.
The SET plan partially addresses the coordination externality with its creation of Joint
Technology Initiatives. The Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking facilitates
coordination between industry, government, and academia. The inter-industry nature
of fuel cell electric vehicles, involving car manufacturers, the chemical industry,
utilities and electricity production, and the information technology industry, further
highlights the requirement for coordination among the diﬀerent players. One aspect of
this policy area is the development of technical and safety standards. Here, binding
and transparent guidelines are required to alleviate concerns amongst consumers
regarding the safety of FCEVs in everyday use. Currently, there is no mechanism for
facilitating the coordination of EU-level standards, let alone international ones. One
exception is the labelling directive of the EU, which helps companies to coordinate on
information standards important for creating consumer acceptance.
Institutional lock-in occurs due to institutions (both academic, governmental, and
demonstration projects may have brought them closer to ‘implementation’.
• IJHFC asserts that predictable government policies supporting technology R&D
are needed to enable technical development of the FC related industries (Source:
JHFC Demo Project Brochure).
industry associations) created for a speciﬁc technology. Educational institutional lock-
in is especially pertinent to a transport and energy system transition. A transition
through the increased use of low-emission vehicles is likely to be accompanied by a
change in demand for relevant skills along the value chain. Accordingly, the National
Platform for Electric Mobility, a stakeholder network set up in Germany to consult the
electric mobility policy process, set up a working-group to coordinate corresponding
eﬀorts.
Super-credits, granted by (EC) No 443/2009, encourage business-exploration into the
low-emissions vehiclemarket33. Combinedwith the emissions targets regulations (also
stipulated by (EC) No 443/2009), these legislative measures encourage businesses
to explore green transport technology markets such as hydrogen FCEV. Public
procurement initiatives both at the EU level (Clean Vehicles Directive 2009/33/EC),
and at the member state level, such as procurement initiatives in France, also help to
encourage business exploration and innovation by creating a demand for low-carbon
technologies.
The insurance externality is partly addressed by funding basic research in all types of
energy technologies. A speciﬁc eﬀort to create a portfolio of back-stop technologies is,
however, not observable.
Some zero-carbon technologies, such as hydrogen FCEV, emit no harmful air pollutants
(such as nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, ozone particles and sulphur
oxides), and less noise. Thus, they already comply with the strictest European
emission standards that will enter into force in 2013-15 (the so-called Euro VI
standards). In addition, various regional laws have targeted pollution directly. For
example, German environmental zoning legislation in some cities prohibits certain
types of cars from entering areas of the city. The aim of this legislation is to improve air
quality. In many countries, speed limits have been put in place partially to combat
noise pollution. Although these regional policies exist, they are fragmented and not
economically-minded.
In contrast to renewable energy technologies, the deployment of FCEVs is currently
neither mandated nor directly supported (apart of the mentioned super credits). At
the EU level, the Clean Vehicles Directive (2009/33/EC) requires that public procure-
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33. Vehicles with CO2 emissions below 50 g/km receive super-credits. Each such vehicle is counted as 3.5 cars in
2012 and 2013, as 2.5 cars in 2014, 1.5 cars in 2015, and as 1 car from 2016. That is, super-credits allow car
manufacturers to maintain more carbon-intensive vehicle ﬂeets than stipulated by the vehicle emission standard,
if they deploy some low-emission vehicles.
ment take into account pollutants in addition to CO2 emissions. National vehicle
taxation schemes and national consumer subsidies in France also encourage cleaner
vehicles. These policies support development of green technologies such as hydrogen
FCEV. Consequently, the creation of positive industrial policy spillovers and the
internalisation of the business exploration externality are at the moment only backed
by the discussed horizontal schemes.
Additionally, some alternative transport technologies are able to meet or exceed fuel
eﬃciency standards. Hydrogen FCEVs have been found in a 2007 pilot to have 53-58
percent net fuel eﬃciency (NREL, 2007). This provides additional beneﬁts – in addition
to the reduction in CO2, less fuel will need to be produced and consumed. Thus, FCEVs
decrease the fuel import dependency for the EU area. This side-beneﬁt is partly
remunerated through the exemption from fuel taxation and incentivised by vehicle
ﬂeet emission standards.
Public support gap
Although there are currently public policy instruments in place which encourage
investment into low-carbon technologies, they are insuﬃcient for addressing the larger
needs of a transport energy transition.
The coordination externality is heightened by a highly fragmented European domestic
market. There is currently no process for determining a pan-European industrial policy
with regards to low-carbon technologies. The issue of the creation of a green internal
market has been raised but Europe is far from achieving an unbroken domestic market
for low-carbon and green technologies. Another issue is that domestic deployment of
new energy and transport technologies brings with it signiﬁcant risk in terms of near-
term distortion of labour and capital markets. Any pan-European industrial policy
should take these risks into account. There is currently no public instrument to
evaluate and address these near-term labour and capital markets risks.
Infrastructure initiatives are fragmented across countries, with individual countries
prioritising electric charging, natural gas outlets, biofuels or hydrogen. Infrastructure
development for the energy transition requires a concerted eﬀort and a careful
consideration of technology choices and compatibility. The future of European
transport depends on an infrastructure which allows for a large domestic European
market and ease of travel, to establish competitiveness for whatever technology is
chosen. Infrastructure is the backbone of any transport technology transition and, as
such, should be uniformly decided upon via consensus-building. Despite Europe’s lead
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
76
in some green technologies, such as Germany’s strength in FCEV, there is a risk of a
‘leaders without followers’ phenomenon without a cohesive policy. Europe may lose its
competitive edge without the development of a strong domestic market. Any energy
transition must also take international competitiveness into consideration.
Industrial policy support for new technologies must be carefully chosen due to the
risky nature of investment into nascent markets and technologies. Currently, support
for various clean energy technologies is fragmented and highly politically driven.
Current green technology investments and support may not be enough to ensure
viable alternative technologies to address the insurance externality. There is currently
no holistic mechanism to assess this gap.
Policy gaps exist in mechanisms to overcome path dependencies on institutions and
technology that have developed for the current transport technologies. Policies must
be implemented to address institutional lock-in and prevent future institutional lock-
in for the chosen technologies. Network eﬀects on the consumer side must be
compensated for or addressed in order to develop suﬃcient demand and encourage
business exploration into new markets. First-mover disadvantages of business
exploration may also be examined as these are not directly addressed by current
policies.
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3 Policy response
The purpose of this chapter is to develop precise recommendations for policymakers,
for supporting the development and possible deployment of new technologies in the
transport and energy sectors in Europe in the long term, in the context of the EU’s 2050
energy and climate goals. These recommendations aim to address the gaps in existing
support policies, which have been identiﬁed in chapter 2.
3.1 Resolving the climate externality
A price on carbon is the ﬁrst-best solution for resolving the climate externality. To
ensure economic eﬃciency, the carbon price needs to be aligned across sectors, over
time and across regions:
1. Marginal abatement costs have to be aligned across sectors to minimise welfare
losses, ie emissions should be reduced in those sectors in which it is cheapest to
do so;
2. The price signal must have a long-term component, ie it should signal that
pollution rights will be scarce beyond 2020 in order to encourage low-carbon
investment;
3. The price signal has to account for international spill-overs, eg there should be
incentives for investments in low-carbon technologies that help to reduce
emissions outside Europe.
Current carbon pricing applications fail when measured against these criteria. Europe’s
emissions trading system is unilateral (only EU), short-term (EU legislation beyond
2020 is subject to revision) and partial (only some sectors are covered in the EU). In
the absence of a universal and long-term price on carbon, complementary instruments
are needed to increase economic eﬃciency. In the following we propose three
complementary policies to improve eﬃciency.
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3.1.1 Inclusion of road transport in the ETS
A cap-and-trade systemsuchas theETS is designed to put a coherent and credible price
on carbon. ETS participants are required to surrender an emission allowance for each
emitted unit of CO2. Currently only about half of the EU’s carbon emissions are covered
by the ETS34. Including road transport in the ETS, so that the price on emission permits
reﬂects themarginal cost of emissions, could inﬂuence theday-to-daydrivingbehaviour
of ﬁnal consumers and freight operators, and shape their vehicle purchase decisions.
In the absence of a price on carbon for fossil fuels, day-to-day driving behaviour might
be marked by a rebound eﬀect. A rebound eﬀect is often observed when more eﬃcient
technologies are introduced. Consumers start to use the technology more because
the eﬃciency improvement leads to lower variable cost (price eﬀect), and consumers
have more income available to purchase the service (income eﬀect). Thus, if a car
becomes more eﬃcient, it also becomes cheaper to use and consequently people
might drive more. The rebound eﬀect is the behavioural response to the cost reduction
of an energy service. The rebound eﬀect for the transport sector can be addressed by
increasing the price of fossil fuels. Furthermore, Popp (2002) and Aghion et al (2011)
ﬁnd that higher prices for conventional fuels drive the rate of energy-eﬃciency
innovation. Thus, internalising the climate externality in the cost of fossil fuels can
stimulate innovation.
An arbitrary price on carbon is, however, not eﬃcient. The proposed carbon component
in the fuel tax35is insuﬃcient to ensure eﬃcient, economy-wide greenhouse gas
mitigation. Only a broad scheme providing a single carbon price across sectors would
ensure cost-optimal abatement. Including transport in the ETS could achieve this.
Implementation could take the formof obliging fuel outlets to buy emission allowances
for the fuel they sell. This would result in the harmonisation of the carbon price across
sectors and incentivise the use of the cheapest available abatement options. This is
important because, if a carbon tax were to be implemented for road transport, and was
diﬀerent from marginal abatement costs in others ETS sectors, eﬃciency would be
compromised because transport fuels produced in diﬀerent sectors would have
diﬀerent abatement costs. For example, the electricity used in electric vehicles (or for
electrolysis to produce hydrogen) is covered by the ETS, while gasoline is not.
Furthermore, inclusion of transport in the ETS would increase the depth of the carbon
market and make the system more resilient.
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34. The ETS covers power generation and heavy industrial plants, and, from 1 January 2012, airlines ﬂying into, out of,
and within the EU.
35. Commission proposal of 13 April 2011 for amending Directive 2003/96/EC.
Consequently, including the transport sector in a general carbon trading system is
a necessary (but not a sufﬁcient) condition to efﬁciently address the climate
externality.
3.1.2 Financial instruments to lock-in a long-term carbon price
The framework underpinning a long-term carbon price should be credible in order to
support the large investments needed. Currently, the EU emission cap for 2020, the
sectoral coverage, the institutional setting beyond 2020 and other key elements of
the ETS are subject to change. Thus, the ETS lacks credibility and fails to provide clear
long-term investment signals36.
As it might be politically and institutionally impossible to lock-in a credible long-term
commitment to a tight emissions trading system in the absence of an international
agreement, second-best options for creating investment certainty should be
considered. A carbon ﬂoor price might seem attractive to today’s low-carbon investors.
However a general ﬂoor price is a rather inﬂexible tool. In case future carbon reduction
potential turns out to be much cheaper than anticipated (eg because of new
technologies or lower economic growth) a high ﬂoor price could result in carbon
reductions becoming needlessly expensive. In addition, a politically set ﬂoor is subject
to change and hence not credible in the long term.
A more targeted alternative could be bilateral option contracts between public
institutions and investors. The public institutions would guarantee a certain carbon
price to an investor37. In case the realised carbon price is below the guaranteed price,
the public institution (the option writer) will pay the diﬀerence to the investor (the
option holder)38. Hence, in case of a low carbon price that might be detrimental to the
competitiveness of a low-carbon investment the investor gets some compensation.
Thus, the investor’s risk is reduced. At the same time, if the public institution issues a
large volume of option contracts, it creates an incentive not to water down future
climate policies. Policies that reduce the carbon price will have a direct budget impact
by increasing the value of the outstanding options. This would tend to increase the
long-term credibility of carbon policies.
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36. The low emission allowance prices in 2011 are a telling example of the lack of conﬁdence of investors in the current
legislation. If market participants were conﬁdent in the stipulated tightening emission cap beyond 2020 and the
crisis-induced short-term oversupply of storable allowances would not lead to dramatically deﬂating prices.
37. Such contracts have been proposed (Ismer and Neuhoﬀ, 2007) as instruments for promoting investment in low-
carbon technologies.
38. Menus of option contracts with diﬀerent characteristics (strike price, option type, maturity) might be oﬀered to
investors.
Such instruments could be provided by a green investment bank – as described in
section 3.4. For example, long-term loans to green investment projects would not be
repayable unless the carbon price rises above a certain level. Consequently, the
political risk is transferred back from the company to the public sector, which is at the
origin of this risk.
Financial instruments that transfer the risks of future climate policy from the private
sector back to the public sector are welfare enhancing.
3.1.3 Schemes to drive supply-side investment
In the absence of a global carbon price, companies will under-invest in low-carbon
technologies because consumers outside Europe will be unwilling to pay a mark-up
for low-carbon products. Consequently, incentives should be established for
companies to invest more in green technologies. The legislation on vehicle ﬂeet
emission standards (see chapter 2) that requires car producers to ensure that their
cars sold in Europe have average CO2 emissions per kilometre below a certain
threshold is an example of an eﬀective approach. Predictably, imposing stricter
thresholds gives producers an incentive to invest in clean alternative technologies.
For many consumers, reasonable vehicle emission standards will come at no
additional cost, as the higher purchase price of vehicles is largely compensated for
by fuel savings associated with emission reductions. It has been argued that markets
alone might not be suﬃcient to incentivise consumers to pay a premium for low-
consumption vehicles, the higher costs of which are recovered through later fuel
savings. Consumers do not properly account for future fuel savings when buying
vehicles, in particular because buyers of new cars that shape the future car ﬂeet are
typically less price sensitive than buyers on the secondary market that eventually
end up driving most of these cars39.
International experience shows that setting environmental standards in large markets
has positive spill-overs on the vehicles oﬀered in markets that are not directly covered
by the standard. For example, the emissions standards for conventional pollutants set
by the California Air Resources Board have become quasi-standards for most
internationally sold models. Correspondingly, ambitious European vehicle-ﬂeet
standards for greenhouse gas emissions are likely to induce other regulators to follow.
In order to comply with domestic and European emission standards, non-European
car producers will invest in low-carbon technologies.
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39. Some consumers, essentially those characterised by a low annual mileage, will however pay a premium that they
will be unable to recover through fuel savings.
Reducing the cost of low-carbon vehicles, and regulatory convergence, will stimulate
the uptake of low-carbon vehicles outside the European market and result in global
emission reductions.
3.2 Resolving the infrastructure externality
Chapter 1 showed that the market will not provide the optimal level of infrastructure
deployment, while chapter 2 demonstrated that a lack of infrastructure will hamper
the deployment of new technologies. Consequently, establishing proper incentives
for early investment in infrastructure is crucial.
3.2.1 Option 1: public funding
In the phase after their installation, most stations for newly introduced low-carbon
fuels (such as hydrogen, exchangeable batteries, biofuels, natural gas) will see limited
use. Due to the initial low load, most stations might only be able to cover their variable
costs in the ﬁrst decade. Without a clear prospect of recovery of their ﬁxed costs,
private companies would refrain from installing new fuelling stations. Public funding
could compensate for the initial investment cost. A suﬃcient network of hydrogen
fuelling stations would, for example, involve about 1000 new fuel stations in Germany
alone, according to industry experts. At a unit-cost of €1 million40, this would add up to
an investment of €1 billion in Germany.
One could envisage diﬀerent approaches for sourcing/channelling this money. It might
be a direct subsidy. Alternatively, it could be organised by placing obligations on
existing suppliers to provide clean fuels (eg the German implementation of the EU
biofuels directive41) or by implicit cross-subsidies from fossil-fuel consumers (such as
German feed-in tariﬀs for electricity generated from renewable sources).
Whatever the funding approach, three issues would arise:
First, due to the initial low density of fuel stations, there would be a lack of (local)
competition. Consequently, each fuel station would have an interest in exercising
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40. According to the NextHyLights (2010) study, the investment cost of ‘Small fuelling stations (100 kg/day)’ is
€570,000, of ‘Medium size fuelling station (300 kg/day)’ is €670,000 and of ‘Large fuelling stations (1,000 kg/day)’
is €1,930,000.
41. Directive 2003/30/EC on the promotion of the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels for transport stipulated that
by20105.75percent of transport fossil fuels should be replaced with biofuels. Germany, for example, implemented
the directive by obliging all fuel outlets to comply with this (tradable) quota (Biokraftstoﬀquotengesetz, 2007).
market power by setting fuel prices signiﬁcantly above their marginal costs. This could
lead to high fuel prices and consequently low penetration of FCEVs42. Thus, the state
would need to regulate prices in order to ensure the optimal uptake of the new
technology. This is challenging in such a new market. Due to the diﬀerent load factors
of the fuel stations, the variable cost per unit of fuel (eg labour cost) would vary
signiﬁcantly. Thus, the optimal fuel price is diﬀerent at each location, which makes
regulation diﬃcult. That is, even if the state supports the deployment of new fuel
stations it could then not simply let competition work to determine the optimal prices.
Second, there are a number of individual transport technologies claiming that
infrastructure is the missing ingredient preventing them becoming a competitive
solution to the clean-transport challenge. Compressed natural gas, liqueﬁed natural
gas, electricity, battery switching, hydrogen and others are competing for infrastructure
roll-out support. Funding for refuelling infrastructure for all of these technologies is
unlikely because of the high cost and because only some of the technologies will
ultimately prove successful.
Third, in the current environment of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis, direct ﬁnancial
commitments that risk leading to visible failures (unused fuel stations) might be very
unpopular.
Consequently, direct subsidies, or indirect ﬁnance through higher fossil fuel prices,
for fuelling stations for a certain technology will be very difﬁcult to implement
politically.
3.2.2 Option 2: establishment of a temporary infrastructure consortium
Individual private actors have an incentive to provide too little new infrastructure, too
late and at a too high price, thus delaying the implementation of new technologies.
One way to overcome this is to increase private incentives to invest by reducing
temporarily the threat of competition for early investors. As argued in the ﬁrst chapter,
most past infrastructure development has beneﬁted from the presence of a natural or
artiﬁcial monopoly. Even today, the European Commission can exempt new electricity
and gas interconnectors from requirements to open them to third parties on a case-by-
case basis. Such exemptions allow the investor to use infrastructure exclusively for a
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42. One alternative to regulationwould be to grant subsidies to anyhydrogen fuel station investment. Then, competition
would bring hydrogen retail prices close to the variable cost. This would, however, lead to an expensive duplication
of investments.
limited period of time. They are provided if the Commission ﬁnds that a corresponding
installation would not have been built without this exemption and the provision is pro-
competitive in the long term.
Because the individual investments are signiﬁcantly lower, refuelling stations only
enjoy natural monopoly conditions in small local markets. As the market grows, the
fuel stations lose their monopoly status because new players enter the local market
(possibly at lower cost) often before the incumbent can recover its initial ﬁxed cost. To
avoid this, the optimal strategy for individual fuelling stations would be to start with
high hydrogen prices in order to quickly recover their ﬁxed costs43. If all fuel stations
act in thisway, the price of hydrogenwill be high and the technologywill not proliferate.
Thus, we suggest creating a temporary consortium that develops a roll-out strategy
for refuelling stations. All new refuelling stations and their fuel price would be approved
by this consortium. In addition, it might be agreed that car manufacturers and/or
hydrogen producers have to pay a premium into the consortium for each car/kg of
hydrogen they sell in the country.
The consortium could be a public-private entity bringing together representatives from
the government, the car industry, the hydrogen industry, the fuel retail sector and the
drivers’ association. This would ensure that industry and consumers take ownership
of the project. Based on its roll-out strategy, the consortium might auction oﬀ speciﬁc
geographical locations in order to ensure full coverage of the country. The multiple bids
of the fuel retail companies for each slot might consist of a fuel price (formula), a lump
sum and the duration of exclusivity. The lump sum might be either positive or negative.
‘Sweet spots’ at highways or in agglomerations might call for a premium payment for
the right to establish (positive lump sum). For remote areas with low potential load,
monetary incentives might be required (negative lump sum). This money could be
collected from auctions of ‘sweet spots’ as well as from vertical arrangements with car
manufacturers andhydrogenproducers that have an interest in the development of the
infrastructure44. This self-regulated, vertically integrated consortium should be able
to work without additional public support and its exemption from competition should
automatically end (after 10 years for example).
The consortium’s institutional structure and the inclusion of the public sector and
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43. Initially, competitors would refrain from entering this location, as the incumbent credibly threatens to reduce prices
in case of entrance. This deters newcomers that would not be able to recover their ﬁxed costs.
44. Alternatively, a standard contract could be proposed and the company that accepts more potentially unproﬁtable
slots gets access to more potentially proﬁtable slots.
consumer representatives should ensure that it is not misused for establishing
collusion within the fuel-retail sector or any other adjacent sector (car manufacturers,
hydrogen producers).
One important issue is time consistency. That is, it should be ensured that
governments will not breach the agreement (exemption from competition, no
administrative price regulation) after the irreversible investments have been made. In
addition, the regulatory model for the period when the consortium ﬁnishes should be
sketched out to enable consistent investment decisions. Ex-ante price or revenue
regulation or ex-post price control are potential models that would require an in-depth
analysis.
The cost (potential anti-competitive eﬀects) and beneﬁts (faster roll-out of the
infrastructure) of such an entity need to be carefully balanced. A corresponding
analysis that takes account of competitive eﬀects at all stages of the value chain goes
beyond the scope of this study. Only after a positive evaluation of the dynamic eﬀects,
might the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition grant the
necessary temporary exemption.
One recent example of such a consortium is the initiative for natural gas vehicles in
Germany (see Box 12).
The establishment of a consortium for the deployment of refuelling infrastructure
could effectively address the infrastructure externalities without direct public
budget support. Competition policy concerns need to be addressed ex ante in order
to ensure time-consistency.
3.3 Financial support
Providing public ﬁnancial support is a common way of compensating private actors
for the positive spill-overs their investment/consumption decisions create for others45.
(Co-)funding industrial R&D and demonstration projects, for example, is supposed to
enable commercially non-viable but socially beneﬁcial private investments in new
technologies to break even. However, simple across-the-board co-funding tends to be
not very well focused (see Box 13 for some numerical illustrations of pro-quota co-
funding schemes). Thus, more sophisticated measures for risk sharing (see next
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45. In economic terms: internalising the positive externalities.
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BOX 12: THE CASE OF COORDINATION: DEPLOYMENT OF NATURAL GAS VEHICLES
AND REFUELLING STATIONS IN GERMANY
Use of natural gas and bio-methane in motor fuels has recently been stepped up in
the EU as one of the ways of decarbonising the transport sector (natural gas has 24
percent lower carbon emissions than petrol and produces less other pollutants, such
as soot and nitrogen dioxides). Currently, Germany has about 900 compressed
natural gas refuelling stations and approximately 90,000 natural gas vehicles. But
natural gas only makes up 0.3 percent of the fuel used for road transport. As most
natural gas vehicles can switch betweennatural gas and gasoline they require no full
coverage and thus signiﬁcantly fewer refuelling stations than non-hybrid tech-
nologies.
The deployment of natural gas vehicles in Germany was partly driven by natural gas
suppliers which continue to cross-subsidise the purchase of natural gas vehicles. In
Berlin, for example, the local gas supplier grants a €333 cash subsidy to natural gas
vehicle buyers. Other suppliers grant a number of free reﬁlls to new natural gas
vehicles.
Germany is the kick-start market for natural gas vehicles. Car producers, refuelling
infrastructure providers and natural gas suppliers agreed to coordinate their eﬀorts
in the ‘Natural Gas Mobility Initiative’, which is coordinated by Deutsche Energie-
Agentur GmbH (DENA). The core task of the Initiative is to support and coordinate
the deployment of refuelling infrastructure. The initiative updates the fuelling station
planning based on which petroleum companies, natural gas companies and a jointly
set-up company are expected to invest in new fuelling stations.
Take-home message: The deployment of natural gas vehicles in Europe is an
interesting learning case for cross-subsidisation along the value chain and
coordination of fuel station deployment for emerging technologies in the transport
sector.
Source: DENA (2011).
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BOX 13: NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION OF A PRO-QUOTA CO-FINANCING SCHEME
To illustrate possible weaknesses in the public co-ﬁnance model, we present
diﬀerent scenarios with diﬀerent realisations of the unknown beneﬁts and cost
which result in diﬀerent social welfare impacts. We assume in each scenario that
the total cost of each project is 100 but that public co-funding of 50 has been
provided, such that the private cost of each project is 50. Diﬀerent scenarios for total
beneﬁt (private beneﬁt and positive externality) are assumed for each project.
For all Scenarios:
Cost: 100
Co-funding: 50
Scenario 2: windfall proﬁts and no additivity (investments would happen
without public support)
Private beneﬁt: 110
Positive externality: 10
Total beneﬁt = private beneﬁt + positive externality = 110 + 10 = 120
Private gains = private beneﬁt – cost + co-funding = 110 – 100 + 50 = 60
Social welfare = total beneﬁt – cost = 120 – 100 = 20
Here, we ﬁnd that there are windfall proﬁts and the project is socially beneﬁcial
but there is no additivity – ie private investment would have occurred without
any co-ﬁnancing due to the private beneﬁt of 110 being greater than the cost.
Scenario 1: windfall proﬁts
Private beneﬁt: 80
Positive externality: 30
Total beneﬁt = private beneﬁt + positive externality = 80 + 30 = 110
Private gains = private beneﬁt – cost + co-funding = 80 – 100 + 50 = 30
Social welfare = total beneﬁt – cost = 110 – 100 = 10
Here, we ﬁnd that there are windfall proﬁts and the project is socially beneﬁcial.
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The diﬀerent scenarios illustrate the many diﬀerent outcomes that can occur with
public co-ﬁnancing. Due to imperfect and asymmetric information, it is suboptimal
to adopt such a schema. Such a schema can result in either social beneﬁts or social
costs depending on uncertain parameters.
Scenario 4: windfall proﬁts
Private beneﬁt: 60
Positive externality: 0
Total beneﬁt = private beneﬁt + positive externality = 60 + 0 = 60
Private gains = private beneﬁt – cost + co-funding = 60 – 100 + 50 = 10
Social welfare = total beneﬁt – cost = 60 – 100 = -40
Here, we ﬁnd that a socially detrimental project is funded. This project is funded
because public co-funding has made an unproﬁtable project proﬁtable for the
private ﬁrm, by reducing the cost of the project to the private ﬁrm. Therefore, an
otherwise unproﬁtable project was undertaken at the cost of social welfare.
Scenario 3: potential social beneﬁts are not reaped
Private beneﬁt: 49
Positive externality: 151
Total beneﬁt = private beneﬁt + positive externality = 49 + 151 = 200
Private gains = private beneﬁt – cost + co-funding = 49 – 100 + 50 = -1
Social welfare = total beneﬁt – cost = 200 – 100 = 100
Here, we ﬁnd that the project does not occur, because, even with co-ﬁnancing,
the private gains would be negative. Investment does not occur. Insuﬃcient co-
ﬁnancing leads to underinvestment and the potential social welfare surplus of
100 is lost.
section) and co-funding have been introduced (see section 3.6 for an evaluation of
the current co-funding schema).
One way to avoid overcompensation (scenario 1 and scenario 2 in Box 13) is to
disburse public funds in the formof reimbursable grants (or non-reimbursable loans)46.
Reimbursable grants allow mitigation of the technology and market risks for new
technologies by providing reimbursable public funding to demonstration and early
deployment of innovative technologies/products. In case market introduction is a
success, these grants are wholly reimbursed (with interest) by the receiving company.
In case of failure only a ﬁxed amount needs to be refunded.
If properly structured, this scheme allows the risk a private actor cannot control to be
shifted to the public sector. In this context it is important that the risks the private
sector can control (eg the management of the project) are not shifted, as otherwise
the private incentives to ensure success are biased.
Reimbursable grants are already used in some member states to stimulate research
and innovation. This is for example the case with some French innovation agencies,
whose methods of funding have been analysed by the European Commission47 (see
Box 14).
If properly designed, reimbursable grants can reduce the risk that private actors are
overfunded.
3.4 Shifting risk
Low-carbon projects are currently often more risky than conventional projects for
various reasons: (1) The cash-ﬂow of many low-carbon projects is critically dependent
on the hard-to-predict future carbon price. The carbon market is not yet well-
established. There are no clear accounting rules for carbon credits and no good models
for hedging corresponding risks. (2) Currently, low-carbon projects rely primarily on
government intervention schemes (subsidies, feed-in tariﬀs, obligations, emissions
allowance trading) which provide neither a stable nor a long-term price signal for
investors. (3) Moreover, the payoﬀs of low-carbon projects are subject to various levels
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46. An alternative disbursement method is discussed in section 3.6.3 where a menu of loans is used to extract quality
and potential viability information from industry. This method can possibly be incorporated with the reimbursable-
grants instrument if the information revelation component may somehow be preserved in the amalgamation.
47. C(2008)279, Aide d’état n° N 408/2007 – France, Régime d’intervention OSEO Innovation en faveur de la recherché,
du développement et de l’innovation.
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BOX 14: FRENCH REIMBURSABLE GRANTS FOR INNOVATION SUPPORT
Reimbursable grants are attributed by the funding agency to a company or a con-
sortium. The grant is characterised by (a) the ratio R between the reimbursable grant
and the total cost of the project and by (b) the terms of the refunding procedure. The
ratio R cannot exceed a maximum value that depends on the nature of funded
projects (basic research, experimental development, industrial innovation, etc).
The refunding procedure is negotiated by the funding agency and by the grantee,
based on the nature of the project, the inherent risk, the maturity of the technology
and the market. The terms of the refunding procedure are commonly established by
the funding agency and the grantee, based on a shared business plan and include:
1. The schedule of repayments, depending on the nature of the project, the inherent
risk, the maturity of the technology and the market, etc.
2. A ﬁxed amount that is systematically owed by the grantee to the funding agency,
even in case of project/market failure. It is only if the company goes bankrupt
that this amount is not reimbursed. This systematic reimbursement usually
ranges from 10 percent to 50 percent of the total grant.
3. The amount of the eﬀective reimbursement, taking into account technical and
commercial success of the project:
• In case of success (i.e. when the cumulated turnover generated by the project
reaches a ﬁrst threshold), the grants are reimbursed by the grantee. This
includes a rate of interest that is greater than or equal to the applicable rate
resulting from the application of EU rules relative to the calculation of reference
and actualisation rates. This implies that, in case of success, the grant is totally
recovered by the funding institution. Using an actualisation rate ensures that
no ﬁnancial advantage is granted to the company.
• If the cumulative turnover generated by the project crosses a second
threshold, proﬁt can be shared between the funding agency and the grantee,
in the form of a percentage of sales (with a limited duration and a maximum
amount that is speciﬁed in the refunding procedure).
• In case of partial success, the amount to be refunded is negotiated, taking
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into account the technical and commercial achievements of the project.
• In case of project/market failure, the grantee only refunds the ﬁxed amount
presented in point 2.
Scenario: simpliﬁed reimbursable grant
Cost: 100
Grant: 60
Positive externality: 100
Case 1: success (50 percent probability)
Private beneﬁt in case of success: 150
Reimbursement in case of success: 60
Positive externality in case of success: 100
Total beneﬁt = private beneﬁt + positive externality = 150 + 100 = 250
Private gains = private beneﬁt – cost + grant – reimbursement = 150 – 100 + 60
- 60= 50
Social welfare = total beneﬁt – cost = 250 – 100 = 150
Case 2: failure (50 percent probability)
Private beneﬁt in case of failure: 0
Reimbursement in case of failure: 5
Positive externality in case of failure: 0
Total beneﬁt = private beneﬁt + positive externality = 0
Private gains = private beneﬁt – cost + grant – reimbursement = – 100 + 60 - 5=
- 45
Social welfare = total beneﬁt – cost = 0 – 100 = -100
Expected results
Expected private gains = 50%*50 + 50%*-45 = 2.5
Expected social welfare = 50%*150 + 50%*-100 = 25
Consequently, some of the project risk is shifted to the public sector. Thereby, the
implementation of this instrument is critical to its eﬀectiveness – ie the
establishment of thresholds, adequate penalties for non-repayment, and proﬁt
accounting criteria.
of political, technical and regulatory uncertainty. Recent regulatory shifts in European
renewables support schemes are telling examples of the political volatility of public
support. For example, Spain and other countries cut their feed-in tariﬀs for existing
and new solar installations because of the ﬁnancial crisis. This resulted in a wave of
bankruptcies of solar companies and a loss of conﬁdence of investors in corresponding
schemes throughout Europe. Regulatory downside risk is not matched by a
corresponding regulatory upside. The reason is that regulatory changes are typically
targeted at creating ‘additionality’ and thus only compensate for investments induced
by the new regulation but ignore existing low-carbon projects. (4) Furthermore, the
regulatory framework for new infrastructure assets (eg hydrogen fuelling stations)
and new appliances (eg technical standards for FCEVs) remain unclear. These
regulatory risks are further exacerbated by the often long-term and capital-intensive
nature of low-carbon investments.
Political, technical, and regulatory uncertainty is a signiﬁcant impediment to private
ﬁnance. Uncertainty, in contrast to risk, cannot be properly quantiﬁed or managed.
Consequently, the absence of a robust regulatory environment and a credible and
suﬃcient carbon price signal translates into higher costs of capital for low-carbon
projects. Private investors face a risk of stranded, or redundant, costswhich are diﬃcult
to manage. This leads to the inability of low-carbon projects to attract long-term debt
and equity ﬁnance, while public funding is insuﬃcient to cover all the gaps in
investment.
A potential solution to the ﬁnancing issues faced by low-carbon projects is being
explored by the UK. The UK Green Investment Bank (GIB) has been proposed as a
publicly-driven intermediary structure. The core tasks of this institution would be to
address the market failures faced by low-carbon projects, and to attract private
investment by managing the inherent risks of low-carbon projects. The novel aspect of
this proposal is a shift from the current public support policies of simply providing
higher subsidies, to a public support system that reduces risks for private investments.
The GIB will start its operations in 2012, with an initial capitalisation of £3 billion.
The UK GIB will help to reduce investment risk in three key ways. First, it will pool and
restructure currently dispersed government grants for funding emerging low-carbon
technologies. Second, it will be responsible for issuing green bonds. In the set-up
phase, low-carbon projects are ﬁnanced by equity. At the end of this phase, when the
projects start to generate positive cash-ﬂows, the GIB will buy up these low-carbon
projects. This allows equity investors with an appetite for high-risk investments to sell
their mature projects in order to generate funds for launching new low-carbon projects.
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The GIB can later issue ‘green bonds’ to reﬁnance its activities based on a wide portfolio
of such cash-ﬂow generating low-carbon projects, and possibly ensuring high ratings
through additional state guarantees. That is, ultimately, the GIB allows institutional
investors, with an appetite for low-risk investments, to ﬁnance low-carbon projects.
Third, the GIB will unlock project ﬁnance through:
• Equity co-investments at the early stages of low-carbon projects.
• The purchase and securitisation of low-carbon project ﬁnance loans (or pooling of
the loans provided by commercial banks for low-carbon projects). In this way, it can
mitigate their risks and increase the lending for these kinds of projects.
• Long-term carbon-price underwriting or the provision of guarantees on a stable level
of a long-term (or ﬂoor) price for investors.
• Providing the insurance products for mitigation of the inherent risks related to a non-
sustainable regulatory framework and possible market failures (eg oﬀering to buy
completed renewables assets, extreme events insurance, contingent loans
facilities).
Comparable instruments have also been implemented in other member states (see
Box 15). They do not, however, share the unique institutional framing of the GIB. The
main drawback of the GIB is its legally-limited borrowing power. The current legislation
only permits the GIB to borrow until 2015-16, on the condition that public sector net
debt will decline as a percentage of GDP48.
Even though, it is too early to evaluate the success of the GIB, the idea for the
establishment of a special ﬁnancial institution thatwill be responsible formanaging the
special risks of low-carbon projects is well worth exploring. Such an institution might
play a major role in attracting the long-term private capital needed for funding
commercial low-carbon investments critical to the success of a post-carbon transition.
Furthermore, a public ﬁnancial institution that is largely exposed to low-carbon
investment projects, through its portfolio, could be an important signal to other
market participants that the public sector is committed to its support policies. This
signal reduces the perceived risk of abrupt support-policy changes, and might make
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
93
48. Sources: Unlocking investments to deliver Britain’s low carbon future, Report of the GIB Commission, (2010);
‘Accelerating green infrastructure ﬁnancing: outline proposals for UK green bonds and infrastructure bank‘, Climate
Change Capital brieﬁng note, March 2009; Helm et al (2009);
http://www.businessandleadership.com/sustainability/item/29090-uk-green-bank-plan-doesnt
49. The Green Deal is the UK carbon emissions reduction project. The purpose of the Green Deal is to encourage as
many people as possible to take measures to make their homes more energy eﬃcient by providing upfront loans
for such measures.
it easier to ﬁnance low-carbon projects through commercial banks. Thus, the
establishment of public instruments that serve to create credibility and to lower
investment risk for private actors, and not merely to subsidise, may prove essential to
the success of a post-carbon transition.
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BOX 15: EXAMPLES OF GREEN FINANCING SUPPORT SCHEMES
=> France: Subsidised Green Loans (Prêts Verts Boniﬁés). These loans are intended
to ﬁnance competitiveness investments that include environmental protection
considerations or that promote the marketing of products relating to environmental
protection and reducing energy consumption (OSEO, 2010).
=> Dutch Green Fiscal Fund: Dutch banks currently beneﬁt from a government-led
Green Fund initiative launched in 1995. By purchasing shares in a green fund, or
investing money in a green bank, citizens are exempted from paying capital gains
tax and receive a discount on income tax. Investors can therefore accept a lower
interest rate on their investment, while banks can oﬀer green loans at a lower cost
to ﬁnance environmental projects. To date, Rabobank has established one of the
more successful green funds; in 2005, its fund had acquired 63,000 investors and
provided €2 billion in green loans.
=> Carbon Funds: Collaboration between multilateral development banks and private
ﬁnancial institutions has led to the emergence of a variety of carbon funds to help
ﬁnance GHG emission reduction projects. Acting as a collective investment scheme,
a carbon fund receives money from investors either to purchase CO2 emission
reduction credits (including, but not limited to, Certiﬁed Emission Reduction credits
or Emission Reduction Units) from existing emission reduction projects, or to invest
in new projects that will generate a stream of CO2 emission reduction credits. Where
government-led carbon funds oﬀer a compliance tool for governments to meet their
Kyoto objectives, private carbon funds oﬀer regulated companies a cost-eﬀective
compliance instrument. They also provide traditional investors with the potential for
cash returns, and marketing and corporate social responsibility opportunities.
=> UK Green Finance Deal (Carbon Trust/Siemens) £550m green ﬁnancing initiative.
The scheme oﬀers a corporate version of the UK government’s proposed Green Deal
scheme49, giving companies the opportunity to cover the cost of ﬁnancing through
the energy savings that result from improved eﬃciency.
A European institution (such as the European Investment Bank) could be used to
attract private capital for low-carbon projects by offering services comparable to
those of the UK Green Investment Bank. Beyond making ﬁnance available for
commercial low-carbon projects, this could also signal the commitment of the public
sector to establish support instruments.
3.5 Public procurement mechanisms
Networked technologies such as transportation pose a fundamental public policy
dilemma. The lack of a ubiquitous network may limit the utility of the new technology
to consumers; and, as we have seen, reduce the home country’s ability to capitalise
abroad on its technological leadership. But choosing a network early on poses
signiﬁcant risks of lock-in, and invites rent-seeking on the part of industrial interests.
The public sector is one of the biggest customers for new vehicles. Furthermore, some
branches of the public sector have very narrow utilisation proﬁles. Consequently,
strategic public procurement to develop such niches could create a sustainable node
for further development. Public policy may therefore wish to provide opportunities for
small-to-medium scale trials of technological alternatives. These trials would generate
experience in real-world operations, provide opportunities for learning-by-doing, and
enable better choices about which network or networks to roll out.
Farrell et al (2003) and others have suggested that municipal transportation ﬂeets –
buses and government vehicles – provide a suitable environment for these trials.
Municipal governments require transportation infrastructure, operate at signiﬁcant
scale for a single buyer, and potentially coordinate between operations and monitoring
and evaluation. However, we note that relying on municipal governments alone poses
several risks. First, no municipal government wishes to make large-scale and
technologically risky investments. Like ﬁrms investing in innovation, municipal
governments quite sensibly want to provide good services for their citizens ﬁrst, and
experimenting with innovation is only a distant second priority. Second, ﬁrms might be
tempted to concentrate their lobbying and pilot project eﬀorts on municipalities whose
characteristics are best suited for a given technology. This would potentially skew the
evaluation of the new technology and its potential for widespread deployment.
Instead, we propose that national governments or European institutions cooperate
with municipalities to structure a coherent series of trials of new transportation
technologies. Regional or national governments may have the capacity to support part
of the ﬁnancial cost of the trial, insulating municipal governments from the risk of
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failure. In exchange for backstopping all or some of the risk, however, national
governments or European institutions should insist on a coherent approach to
selecting the technologies that are deployed in diﬀerent circumstances. In an ideal
world, this could take the form of a randomised experiment. The theoretical diﬃculties
of eﬀectively structuring such an experiment for large infrastructure projects may
forestall this option. But even if this proves impractical, the government assuming the
risk should also insist on a neutral approach to selecting and deploying the
technologies in question, and should design universal evaluation criteria.
Germany’s E-energie programmes may provide an example of a well-structured project
in a diﬀerent industrial domain. The E-energie programmes provide six trial projects
for another example of networked technologies, the smart grid. Like low-emissions
transport technologies, the smart grid oﬀers huge promise for eﬃciency
improvements and emissions reduction, but massive technological risk. It also
provides little utility without widespread deployment. By providing six diﬀerent trial
programmes, with diﬀerent industrial consortia, the E-energie programme enables
comparison of diﬀerent approaches to the smart grid without commitment to a single
network standard. A similar approach to alternative transport technologies may yield
similar dividends.
Using public procurement to conduct real-world experiments could uncover valuable
information. This requires that the responsible local, municipal or regional public
authorities are able to accept failures in the trials they conduct. Consequently, federal
or European compensation mechanisms might be necessary.
3.6 A consistent policy response
In the following we argue that a purely technology-neutral approach is not feasible for
economic and political reasons (section 3.6.1). Hence, policymakers have to choose
certain technologies anddecidewhen andhow to support them (3.6.2). But the current
approach towards technology choice is not eﬃcient (3.6.3). A more sound and
predictable support mechanism is necessary (3.6.4). Combined with horizontal
policies such technology speciﬁc support could form a consistent policy response
(3.6.5).
3.6.1 Limits of technology neutrality
Some horizontal policies already exist, targeting for example the climate and
innovation externality. Carbon pricing, patent legislation, taxes on fossil fuels, funding
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for basic research and education, and other horizontal measures are largely
technology-neutral. The approaches proposed in this report, to compensate for
ineﬃcient or insuﬃcient climate policies, are not technology-speciﬁc either.
Furthermore, the suggested infrastructure consortium might likewise be applied to
other emerging green technologies that require a dedicated infrastructure. However,
the existing and proposed measures will not eliminate all externalities identiﬁed in
this report.
Hence, governments have implemented menus of additional support mechanisms
speciﬁcally targeted at certain green technologies. Public R&D (co-)funding policies
target the innovation externality, and public ﬁnancial support for demonstration
projects target the business-exploration externality. These policies may reap eventual
industrial policy spill-overs and break unwanted path dependencies. They are, by
nature, more technology-speciﬁc. Technology-neutral across-the-board funding would
be infeasible due to limited public ﬁnances and the spatial/resource requirements of
such endeavours. Funding large-scale demonstration and deployment projects for all
technologies would not only be extremely expensive50, it would also ignore the fact
that diﬀerent technologies are contemporaneously in diﬀerent stages of their
development.
3.6.2 The technology choice challenge
Decisions about which technology to support, and when and how to support it, are
extremely diﬃcult, as they involve the evaluation of technologies of unknown future
merits. Furthermore, the social value of each technology is not self-standing, but
depends on the performance of all competing technologies. Thus, simply funding all
technologies according to their – already diﬃcult to establish – individual societal
value is not optimal in the presence of competing technologies.
And errors could be costly. The argument that doing a bit too much for one green
technology might be forgivable, on the basis of erring on the safe side does not
necessarily hold. In the presence of multiple new technologies that compete not only
for a market but also for production factors, excessive support to one technology might
even slow development. Government action may provide a focal point for a ‘less-
eﬃcient’ technology, directing not only its own ﬁnancial resources but also other
production factors (skilled labour, capital, etc) away from the more eﬃcient
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50. For example, as discussed in section 3.3, undiﬀerentiated co-ﬁnancing could create signiﬁcant windfall proﬁts
and wastage.
technologies. Thus, an eventual break-through of the more eﬃcient technologies may
be delayed. In the presence of network eﬀects, a more eﬃcient technology might
become locked out due to early support of a less eﬃcient competing technology.
In addition, because of the high uncertainties inherent in an energy and transport
system transition, it is likely that some technologies will not live up to their promises.
Selecting a portfolio of technologies is warranted in order to make the vital transition
resilient to unexpected shocks. Consequently, the question is how to design a
mechanism that evaluates all available technologies in order to ensure that public
support is channelled to a portfolio of technologies, in order to underpin the most
eﬀective and eﬃcient transition.
3.6.3 Status quo
Current support policies are not technology-neutral. Typically, governments deﬁne
budgets to support individual technologies. These budgets are then allocated by the
administration with the clear aim of making the individual technology viable. In the
political process, priority is given to technologies that allow quick visible deployment,
are supported by strong vested interest and/or are in fashion. The technology-choice
decisions are often justiﬁed by modelling results. However, the corresponding models
are typically proprietary and ambiguous to the outsider. The key assumptions for these
models are usually submitted by stakeholders with vested interests. Furthermore,
coordination of support (eg controlled experiments discussed in section 3.5) rarely
occurs on the international, or even European or national levels, and strongly deviating
national support measures might point to hidden state aid51. Consequently, current
technology choice decisions are picking ‘winners’ but the choices are hardly
predictable.
3.6.4 A consistent and predictable support mechanism
A level playing ﬁeld for public support for new technologies requires that governments’
choices of a technology portfolio should not be driven by the question of ‘which’ but
by the question of ‘how’. Governments should adopt choice mechanisms that are
dynamic and adaptive, able to digest new information and optimise support in a quick,
reliable and eﬀective manner. A ﬂexible mechanism is essential for dealing with
shifting exogenous economic and political events, and unforeseeable developments
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51. Consequently, technology-speciﬁc support is regularly subject to state aid inquiries by national and European
competition authorities.
in technology. An adaptive technology-choice mechanism, able to self-evaluate and
evolve to meet changing technology choice needs, would also serve to avoid
institutional lock-in52. As in all policy ﬁelds there is a trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and
reliability. Locking in bad decisions for the sake of reliability is just as bad as not
creating credible long-term investment signals so as tomaintain ﬂexibility. The solution
to this dilemma is building transparency into the mechanism. Transparency is critical
for the success of any choice mechanism, so that industry and consumers can form
the right expectations over the direction of technology. The only way to control the
potential impacts of public policy on industry investment choices is through a
transparent policy clearly communicating government priorities and decision
parameters. Transparency also promotes fair competition and inspires trust on the
part of industry and consumers. Stakeholder trust is fundamental to the success of
energy transition policy. Finally, it is important to note that the mechanism should be
utilised to select not only one, but a portfolio of technologies53.
The ﬁrst step in constructing a technology-choicemechanism is to deﬁne a transparent
set of metrics and priorities (which may later be updated, as the demands of society
and climate action change). The interest of governments is to support the optimal
portfolio of technologies in terms of certain metrics – such as costs, timeline,
eﬃciency, beneﬁts and safety. These metrics and priorities should be as technology-
neutral as possible, and should be the driving force behind the technology-choice
mechanism.
All stakeholders involved in the selection of new technologies face the problem of
imperfect information. In the initial demonstration and early market phases,
information about payoﬀs and costs is not fully known. Much of the progression along
learning curves occurs during the commercialisation stage (Schoots et al, 2010). In the
case of FCEVs, the timeline and scale of cost reductions from commercialisation are as
yet unknown. Other factors, such as consumer expectations, trust, research capacity
and connection with higher learning, also play roles in determining the success of a
technology. These are hard to measure or even predict. However, industry possesses
the best information about the prospects of their new technology, and this information
is not necessarily accessible by the government (asymmetric information). Thus, it is
the responsibility of industry to report this information to government if it desires
public support. However, the developers of diﬀerent technologiesmay have an interest
in overstating the capabilities, or understating the cost, of their respective technologies
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52. Institutional lock-in is described in section 1.2.3: Path dependencies.
53. The merits of a technology portfolio are discussed in section 1.2.7.
in order to attract more support (or even lock out competitors). Therefore, the public
technology-choice mechanism must be one that iteratively elicits unbiased estimates
from industry.
One example of a mechanism for achieving this would be for companies/
consortia/academia to oﬀer a ‘menu’ of diﬀerent support options for the develop-
ment/deployment of their new technologies. This menu would contain promises on
the metrics deﬁned in the ﬁrst step of the mechanism’s design, and the expected form
and volumeof support. Attached to each optionwould be a requirement tomeet certain
quality metrics by a certain date, penalties for failing to meet the metric by the date,
and a reward for achieving it (a low interest rate for example). Thus, using monetary
incentives, government may be able to elicit more accurate cost and quality
information from industry.
An open and transparent energy and transport transition model would be used to
evaluate the proposed packages. The model would suggest a combination of support
options to develop a suﬃciently resilient portfolio of technologies at lowest cost. The
model should be run and maintained by a central authority such as the Agency for the
Coordination of Energy Regulators, the Strategic Energy Technology Information
System, or a new institution.
This process should be repeated after a certain interval to update assumptions and
adapt to a changing technological environment. If feasible, a trigger should be deﬁned
so that this process is initiated outside of the predetermined cycle when new
developments warrant it. The deﬁnition of such mechanisms is beyond the scope of
this report, but the ﬁeld of microeconomic engineering holds promise for potential
solutions to information issues faced in technology decisions for the transport and
energy transition.
At the very least, such mechanisms may provide a better avenue for choice
mechanism deﬁnition than a simple ‘shot-in-the-dark’ deﬁnition of thresholds or
numbers (such as 50-50 co-ﬁnancing or one-million cars in 2020). A European
mechanism for allocating support to technologies can create a level playing ﬁeld for
competing technologies. It may promote more coordination between regions, nations
and companies. The cost of the transition is put at several percentage points of GDP54.
Therefore, large-scale government intervention will be unavoidable. Consequently, a
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54. According to the German Council of Economic Experts (2011), in 2011 the NPV of all feed-in tariﬀ obligations alone
amounts to €80 billion. This is about two percent of Germany’s GDP.
structured approach adapted to the complexity of the challenge is warranted to avoid
extensive ineﬃciencies.
3.6.5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that market barriers hamper the introduction of new low-carbon
energy and transport technologies. Resolving each of these market failures
individually with the most technology-neutral approach appears eﬃcient. If, however,
a new technology does not take oﬀ after all externalities are corrected, this does not
indicate that more support is needed. In such a case, the lack of development, in fact,
signals that the technology is not (yet) ready for the market or that better technologies
exist.
Political and practical constraints limit the applicability of technology-neutral
approaches. Some market failures are better dealt with by technology-speciﬁc
instruments. However, there is a signiﬁcant risk of government providing support to
the wrong technologies at the wrong point in time with the wrong instrument.
A predictable and economically sound mechanism for allocating support could reduce
the cost of transition to a new transport and energy system. This would require that
policymakers move from ad-hoc allocations to speciﬁc technologies to a more model-
based approach towards the provision of support. Even if policymakers are unwilling
to cede discretionary power over support decisions to a European transition model,
building up open and transparent public modelling capabilities is a no-regret option. It
would step-up the level of discussion over modelling assumptions and hence the
optimal policies.
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Appendix
A.1 Modelling consumer acceptance and policy impacts
MMEM (Marktmodell Elektromobilität) is a simulation model designed to forecast and
evaluate policies that aim to promote the diﬀusion of alternative-fuel vehicles. Its core
component is a market simulation module that is based on discrete choice modelling
to forecast the evolution of diﬀerent automotive technologies on the German market.
It covers nine competing technologies (gasoline, diesel, hybrid, biofuels, LPG-CNG,
battery electric vehicles, range extender, plug-in hybrid, fuel cell). The car market is
divided into diﬀerent submarkets (privately owned household cars, rental cars, cars
purchased by resellers, company cars for private use, corporate ﬂeet including
company cars, and public procurement), which are characterised bydiﬀering purchase
mechanisms. In this section, we concentrate on household vehicles, which constitute
the single largest submarket.
In addition to the diﬀerentiated characterisation of consumer groups, the model takes
the diﬀerent vehicle segments of the market into account, corresponding to diﬀerent
vehicle sizes. The level of decomposition in the model is larger than in other existing
models, and is based on the Kraftfahrtbundesamt (KBA – Federal Motor Transport
Authority) categorisation in use in the German administration. It includes 11 vehicle
size categories (microcar, subcompact car, compact car, mid-size car, upper medium-
sized, executive car, sports utility vehicles, sports cars, minivan, people-carrier, and
light freight vehicles). The model is ‘dynamic’, ie the market shares of respective
technologies and segments are a function of the time-dependent value of car
attributes.
The car purchase discrete choice model is based on a meta-analysis of stated-
preference surveys and constructs a synthetic utility function based on willingness-
to-pays (WTP) and elasticities found in the literature. The model also contains a
‘diﬀusion’ module, that uses the discrete choice model as input data (to be understood
as ‘potential market shares’), and computes adjusted market shares based on a Bass-
like diﬀusion model (Bass, 1969). The model can be run for a reference scenario which
represents the most likely scenario. It can also be run for a variety of policy scenarios
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which activate a series of policy measures (purchase incentive, fuel taxation, etc). The
model provides the data for computation of CO2 emissions in the reference and policy
scenarios, which can then be performed as discussed in the next section.
The modelling results can help answer a number of questions. Firstly, will achieving the
target with respect to the factors described above lead to the achievement of the
market penetration objectives posed by the various stakeholders – namely a 25
percent share of new purchases by 2050? Secondly, what are the consequences of
missing the targets to the market uptake? Furthermore, diﬀerent support scenarios
can be assessed to establish how measures such as R&D funding, infrastructure
support and others might aﬀect the speed of FCEV market uptake.
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Decarbonising Europe’s energy and transport systems
Europe’s energy and transport systems face the major challenge of cutting their
carbon footprints to near zero. Due to the limited carbon-reduction potential of
incumbent technologies, new low-carbon technologies will have to enter the
mainstream market. Some of those new technologies offer significant side-
benefits such as reducing local pollutant and noise emissions. Decarbonising
the economy based on new technologies is also likely to  generate growth.
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and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, argues that to change a system that is so
locked in to incumbent technologies, and to make decarbonisation growth friend-
ly, a consistent policy approach is needed. The scope, geographical coverage and
duration of carbon pricing should be extended. By setting a higher carbon price,
incentives for developing and investing in new low-carbon technologies are creat-
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failures could be put in place. This is discussed using the example of hydrogen
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